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VALUE-BASED DISTANCE BETWEEN THE INFORMATION
STRUCTURES
FABIEN GENSBITTEL, MARCIN PĘSKI, JÉRÔME RENAULT
Abstract. We define the distance between two information structures as the
largest possible difference in the value across all zero-sum games. We provide
a tractable characterization of the distance, as the minimal distance between 2
polytopes. We use it to show various results about the relation between games
and single-agent problems, the value of additional information, informational
substitutes, complements, etc. We show that approximate knowledge is similar
to approximate common knowledge with respect to the value-based distance.
Nevertheless, contrary to the weak topology, the value-based distance does not
have a compact completion: there exists a sequence of information structures,
where players acquire more and more information, and ε > 0 such that any
two elements of the sequence have distance at least ε. This result answers by
the negative the second (and last unsolved) of the three problems posed by
J.F. Mertens in his paper “Repeated Games", ICM 1986.
1. Introduction
The role of information is of fundamental importance for the economic theory.
It is well known that even small differences in information may lead to significant
differences in the behavior (Rubinstein (1989)). A recent literature on the strategic
(dis)-continuities has studied this observation very intensively and in full generality.
The approach is to typically consider all possible information structures, modeled
as elements of an appropriately defined universal information structure, and study
the differences in the strategic behavior across all games.
A similar methodology has not been applied to study the relationship between
the information, and the agent’s bottom line, their payoffs. There are perhaps few
reasons for this. First, following Dekel et al. (2006), Weinstein and Yildiz (2007)
and others, the literature has focused on the interim rationalizability as the solution
concept. Compared with the equilibrium, this choice has several advantages: it
is easier to analyze, it is more robust from the decision-theoretic perspective, it
can be factorized through the Mertens-Zamir hierarchies of beliefs (Dekel et al.
(2006), Ely and Peski (2006)), and, it does not suffer from the existence problems
(unlike the equilibrium - see Simon (2003)). However, the value of information is
typically measured in the ex ante sense, where solution concepts like the Bayesian
Nash equilibrium being more appropriate. Second, the multiplicity of solutions
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necessitates that the literature takes the set-based approach. This, of course, makes
the quantitative comparison of the value of information difficult. Last but not least,
the freedom in choosing games without any restriction makes the payoff comparison
between information structures useless (see Section 7.1 for a detailed discussion of
this point).
Nevertheless, we find the questions about the value of a general-formulated infor-
mation as important and fascinating. How to measure the value of information on
the universal type space? How much a player can gain (or lose) from an additional
information? Which information structures are similar, in the sense that they al-
ways lead to the same payoffs? In order to address these questions, we propose to
restrict the analysis to zero-sum games. It is a natural restriction for both con-
ceptual and methodological reasons. The question of the value of information is of
special importance when the players’ interests are opposing. With zero-sum games,
the information has natural comparative statics: a player is better off when her
information improves and/or the opponent’s information worsens (Peski (2008)).
Such comparative statics are intuitive, they hold in the single-agent decision prob-
lems (Blackwell (1953)), but they do not hold for general games, where better
information may worsen a player’s strategic position. Moreover, the restriction
avoids some of the problems mentioned in the previous paragraph. Finite zero-
sum games have always an equilibrium on common prior information structures
(Mertens et al. (2015)) that depends only on the distribution over hierarchies of
beliefs. The equilibrium has decent decision-theoretic foundations (Brandt (2019)).
Even if the equilibrium is not unique, the ex ante payoff always is and it is equal to
the value of the zero-sum game. Finally, the restriction leads to novel issues com-
paring to the earlier literature, where many of the results rely on either coordination
games, or betting games (Rubinstein (1989), Morris (2002), Ely and Peski (2011),
Chen and Xiong (2013) among others).We believe that it is important to reconsider
various phenomena to clarify their relevance for different classes of games.
We define the distance between two information structures as the largest possible
difference in the value across all zero-sum payoff functions that are bounded by a
constant. This has a straightforward interpretation as a tight upper bound on the
gain or loss from moving from one information structure to another. The first
result provides a characterization of the distance as the total variation distance
between two sets of information structures: those that are better for player one
than one of the original information structures and those that are worse than the
other one. This distance can be computed as a solution to a finitely dimensional
convex optimization problem.
The characterization is tractable in applications. In particular, we use it to
describe the conditions under which the distance between information structures is
maximized in single-agent problems (which are special class of zero-sum games). We
recover the characterization of a comparison of information structures from Peski
(2008), which generalized to 2 players the Blackwell’s comparison of experiments
via garblings. We also discuss the role of the marginal distribution over the state.
An important aspect of our approach is its natural and simple interpretation. It
allows us to define the value of an additional piece of information as the distance
between two type spaces, in one of which one or two players have an access to new
information. The above characterization of the distance allows us to prove numer-
ous results about the value. We give conditions when the value of new information
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is maximized in the single-agent problems. Next, we describe the situations when
the value of one piece of information decreases when the other piece of information
becomes available, in other words, when the two pieces of information are substi-
tutes. Similarly, we show that, under some conditions, the value of one piece of
information increases when the other player gets an additional information, or in
other words, that the two pieces of information, one for each player, are comple-
ments. Finally, we show that the new information matters only if it is valuable
to at least one of the players individually. The joint information contained in the
correlation between player’s signals is in itself not valuable in the zero-sum games.
Apart from its quantitative metric aspect, our distance contains interesting topo-
logical information. In a striking example, we show that any information structure
in which with a large (close to 1) probability, each player assigns a large (close to
1) probability to some state is similar to a structure in which the state is publicly
revealed. In other words, the distinction between approximate knowledge and ap-
proximate common knowledge (Monderer and Samet (1989)) is not relevant for the
value-based distance. There is a simple intuition for this. The common knowledge
is a statement about the joint information. In order to benefit from it, the players’
interests need to be somehow aligned, like in coordination games. That is of course
impossible in a situation of conflict.
More generally, we show that any sequence of countable information structures
converges to a countable structure if and only if the associated hierarchies of beliefs
converge in the induced weak topology of Mertens and Zamir (1985). Thus, at least
in the neighborhoods of countable structures, the higher order beliefs matter less
and less in zero-sum games. This leads to a question whether the higher order
beliefs matter at all. Perhaps surprisingly in the light of the above results, the
answer is affirmative. We demonstrate it by constructing an infinite sequence of
information structures un, such that all the information structures n′ ≥ n have the
same n-the order hierarchies of beliefs. We show that there exists ε > 0 such that
the value-based distance between each pair of structures is at least ε. In the proof,
we construct a Markov chain with the first element of the chain is correlated with
the state of the world. We construct an information structure µn so that player 1
observes the first n odd elements of the sequence and the other player observes the
first n even elements. Our construction implies that in information structure µn+1
each player gets an extra signal. Thus, having more and more information may
lead... nowhere. This is unlike the single-player case, where more and more signals
is a martingale and the value converges for each decision problem. We conclude
that our distance is not robust with respect to the correct specification of higher
order beliefs.
The last result sounds similar to the results from the strategic (dis)continuities
literature. However, we emphasize that our result is entirely novel. In particular,
and it has to deal with at least two major difficulties. The first difficulty is that all
earlier constructions heavily relied on non-zero sum games: with either coordination
games, or betting elements. Such constructions do not work in zero-sum games.
Another difficulty is that when we construct games in which the players’ payoffs
depend on their higher-order beliefs, we are constrained by an uniform payoff bound.
VALUE-BASED DISTANCE BETWEEN THE INFORMATION STRUCTURES 4
An important contribution of our result is that it leads to an answer to the last
open problem posed in Mertens (1986)1. Specifically, his Problem 2 asks about the
equicontinuity of the family of value functions over information structures across
all (uniformly bounded) zero-sum game. The positive answer would have imply the
equicontinuity of the discounted and the average value in repeated games, and it
would have consequences for the convergence in the limits theorems2. One can show
that the problem 2 is equivalent to a question whether the value-based distance is
totally bounded3 on countable information structures. Unfortunately, our results
imply that the answer to the problem is negative. In particular, it is not possible
to approximate the universal information structure with finitely many well-chosen
information structures.
Our paper adds to the literature on the topologies of information structures.
This literature was spurred by an observation in Rubinstein (1989) that solution
concepts are highly sensitive to higher-order beliefs. Dekel et al. (2006) introduce
strategic and uniform-strategic topologies. In the latter, two types are close if, for
any (not necessarily zero-sum) game, the sets of (almost) rationalizable outcomes
are (almost) equal (see also Morris (2002)). 4 Chen et al. (2010) and Chen et al.
(2016) provide a characterization of the uniform-strategic topology in terms of
the uniform weak topology on belief hierarchies. There are two key differences
between that and our approach. First, the uniform strategic topology applies to
all (including non-zero sum) games. Our restriction allows us to clarify which of
the results established in the literature hold in situations of pure conflict. Second,
we work with ex ante information structures and the equilibrium solution concept,
whereas the uniform strategic topology is designed to work on the interim level,
with rationalizability. The ex ante equilibirum approach is more appropriate for
the value comparison and other related questions. For instance, in the information
design context, the quality of he information structure is typically evaluated before
players receive any information.
The value of information literature studies the impact of information on the pay-
offs in various classes of games. Examples include single agent problems (Blackwell
(1953), Athey and Levin (2018)), zero-sum games (Gossner and Mertens (2001),
Shmaya (2006)), common interest games Lehrer et al. (2010, 2013), non-zero-sum
static games (Gossner (2000)), Markov games (Renault (2006), Pęski and Toikka
(2017)), among many others. Our paper contributes with the characterization of
the tight upper bound on the loss/gain from moving from one information struc-
ture to another. The characterization allows us to discuss various results about the
value of additional information. In particular, we characterize the situations when
the two pieces of information are substitutes or complements in zero-sum games
1Problem 1 asked about the convergence of the value, and it was proved false in Ziliotto (2016).
Problem 3 asked about the equivalence between the existence of the uniform value and the uniform
convergence of the value functions, it was proved to be false by Monderer and Sorin (1993) and
Lehrer and Monderer (1994).
2 Equicontituity of value functions is used to obtain limit theorems in several works as
e.g. Mertens and Zamir (1971), Forges (1982), Rosenberg and Sorin (2001), Rosenberg (2000),
Rosenberg and Vieille (2000), Rosenberg et al. (2004), Renault (2006), Gensbittel and Renault
(2015), Venel (2014), Renault and Venel (2016). See section 6.3 for a more detailed discussion
3Recall that a metric space if for all ε > 0, it can be covered by finitely many balls of radius ε.
4 Dekel et al. (2006) focus mostly on the weaker notion of strategic topology that differs from the
uniform strategic in the same way that the pointwise convergence differs from uniform convergence.
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(Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009) study when the information acquisition decisions
are complements or substitutes in a beauty contest game).
Finally, this paper contributes to a recent but rapidly growing field of informa-
tion design (Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), Ely (2017), Bergemann and Morris
(2015), to name a few). In that literature, a principal designs an information
structure which the agents use to play a game with incomplete information. The
objective is to maximize the principal’s payoff from the equilibrium outcome of
some game. Sometimes, the design of information may be divorced from the game
itself. For example, a bank may acquire a software to process and analyze large
amounts of financial information before knowing what stock they are going to trade
on, or, a spy master allocates resources to different tasks or regions before she un-
derstands the nature of future conflicts. Our result shows that the choice space of
information structures is large: there is no natural way in approximating the space
of choices with a finite set of structures.
Section 2 defines the value-based distance. Section 3 provides and discusses the
characterization of the distance as a total variation distance between two sets of
measures. Section 4 lists various results about the value of additional information.
We discuss the topological content of the value-based distance in Section 5. Section
6 shows that the space of countable information structures is not totally bounded
for the value-based distance. Section 7 discusses the relation to other topologies
on the space of hierarchies of beliefs. The last section concludes. The proofs are
contained in the Appendix.
2. Model
Let K be a finite set, |K| ≥ 2. A (countable) information structure is an element
u ∈ ∆(K × N×N) of the space of probabilities over tuples (k, c, d) ∈ K × N×N,
with the interpretation that k is a state of the world, and c and d are the signals
of, respectively, player 1 and player 2. In other words, an information structure is
a 2-player common prior Harsanyi type space over K with at most countably many
types. The set of information structures is denoted by U = ∆(K × N×N).
We will identify any probability overK×C×D where C,D are at most countable
sets with an element of U , where we interpret C and D as subsets of N5 . For
L = 1, 2, ..., let U (L) be the subset of information structures where each player
receives a signal smaller or equal to L − 1 with probability 1, so that each player
has at most L different signals.
Whereas previous papers in the literature restrict attention6 to a particular sub-
set of U (independent information, lack of information on one side, fixed support...),
we will study the general case of information structures in U .
We evaluate information structures via the values of associated zero-sumBayesian
games. A payoff function is a map g : K × I × J → [−1, 1], where I, J are finite
sets of actions. The set of payoff functions with action sizes of cardinality ≤ L
5 More precisely, we associate with every set C which is at most countable an enumeration, i.e.
a bijective map φC between C and {0, ..., |C| − 1|} when C is finite or N when C is infinite and
identify the information structure u ∈ ∆(K × C ×D) with the distribution of (k, φC(c), φD(d))
induced by u. All our results are independent of the choice of these enumerations
6For instance, one can read in De Meyer et al. (2010) “We leave open the question of what
happens when the components of the state on which the players have some information fail to be
independent.... In this situation the notion of monotonicity is unclear, and the duality method is
not well understood."
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is denoted by G(L), and let G =
⋃
L≥1 G(L) be the set of all payoff functions. A
information structure u and a payoff function g together define a zero-sum Bayesian
game Γ(u, g) played as follows: First, (k, c, d) is selected according to u, player 1
learns c and player 2 learns d. Then simultaneously player 1 chooses i ∈ I and
player 2 chooses j ∈ J , and finally the payoff of player 1 is g(k, i, j). The zero-sum
game Γ(u, g) has the value (the unique equilibrium, or the minmax payoff of player
1) which we denote by val(u, g). We sometimes refer to player 1 as the maximizer,
and to her opponent as the minimizer.
We define the value-based distance between two information structures as the
largest possible difference in the value across all payoff functions:
(2.1) d(u, v) = sup
g∈G
| val(u, g)− val(v, g)|.
The distance (2.1) satisfies two axioms of a metric: the symmetry, and the
triangular inequality. However, it is possible that d(u, v) = 0 for u 6= v. For
instance, if we start from an information structure u and relabel the signals of the
players, we obtain an information structure u′ which is formally different from u,
but “equivalent” to u. Say that u and v are equivalent, and write u ∼ v, if for
all game structures g in G, val(u, g) = val(v, g). We let U∗ = U / ∼ be the set of
equivalence classes. Thus, d is a pseudo-metric on U and a metric on U∗.
In order to state our main results, we will also use the total variation norm given
for each u, v ∈ U by:
‖u− v‖ =
∑
k,c,d
|u(k, c, d)− v(k, c, d)|.
Since all payoffs are in [−1, 1] it is easy to see that d(u, v) ≤ ‖u− v‖ ≤ 2. It is also
convenient to always identify I and J with the sets {0, ..., |I|−1} and {0, ..., |J |−1}
using some enumeration and to extend g on K × N×N by letting g(k, i, j) = −1
if i ≥ |I| and g(k, i, j) = 1 if i < |I| and j ≥ |J |. Note that the value of the game
Γ(u, g) is not modified and that optimal strategies remain optimal if we allow the
players to take any action in N. With this convention, each set G(L) and thus also
G is identified with a subset of the set of maps from K × N×N to [−1, 1].
3. Computing d(u, v)
We give here a tractable characterization of d(u, v) and we illustrate it with some
applications.
3.1. Characterization of d (u, v). We start with the notion of garbling, used by
Blackwell to compare statistical experiments Blackwell (1953). A garbling is an
element q : N → ∆(N), and the set of all garblings is denoted by Q. Given a
garbling g and an information structure u, we define the information structures q.u
and u.q so that for each k, c, d,
q.u(k, c, d) =
∑
c′
u(k, c′, d)q(c′|c), and
u.q(k, c, d) =
∑
d′
u(k, c, d′)q(d′|d).
We also denote by Q(L) the subset of garblings q : N→ ∆({0, ..., L−1}). There are
two interpretations of a garbling. First, the garbling can be seen as an information
loss: suppose that (k, c, d) is selected according to u, c′ is selected according to the
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probability q(c), and player 1 learns c′ (and player 2 learns d). The new information
structure is exactly equal to q.u, where the signal received by player 1 has been
deteriorated through the garbling q. Similarly, u.q corresponds to the dual situation
where the signal of player 2 has been deteriorated. Further, the garbling q can
also be seen as a behavior strategy of a player in a Bayesian game Γ(u, g): if the
signal received is c, play the mixed action q(c). The relation between the two
interpretations plays an important role in the proof of Theorem 1 below.
Theorem 1. For each u, v ∈ U for
sup
g∈G
(val(v, g)− val(u, g)) = min
q1∈Q,q2∈Q
‖q1.u− v.q2‖.(3.1)
If u, v ∈ U (L) for L ∈ N, then all the optima can be attained by L-based structures
(games and garblings). Hence,
d(u, v) = max
{
min
q1∈Q,q2∈Q
‖q1.u− v.q2‖, min
q1∈Q,q2∈Q
‖u.q1 − q2.v‖
}
.
The Theorem provides a characterization of the value-based distance between two
information structures u and v for each player as a total variation distance between
two sets obtained as garblings of the original information structures {q.u : q ∈ Q}
and {v.q : q ∈ Q}. If the two information structures are in U(L), then all the
suprema in the first line can be achieved by payoffs functions in G(L), and garblings
in Q(L).
The Theorem simplifies the problem of computing the value-based distance in
two ways. First, it reduces the dimensionality of the optimization domain from
payoff functions and strategy profiles (to compute value) to a pair of garblings.
More importantly, notice that the solution to the original problem (2.1) is typically
a saddle-point as it involves finding optimal strategies in a zero-sum game. On
the other hand, the function ‖q1.u− v.q2‖ is convex in garblings (q1, q2), and the
domains Q are convex compact sets. Thus, the right-hand side of (3.1) is a con-
vex optimization problem. Moreover, if u, v ∈ U(L) for some L ∈ N, this convex
problem is equivalent to a finite dimensional polyhedral convex problem. The char-
acterization of the distance is quite tractable. We show it in numerous applications
in this and subsequent sections.
3.2. Comments and applications.
3.2.1. Single-agent problems. A special case of a zero-sum game is a single-agent
problem. Formally, a payoff function g ∈ G(L) is a single-agent (player 1) problem if
g (k, i, j) = g (k, i, j′) for any k ∈ K and any i, j, j′ ∈ {0, ..., L−1} (or alternatively,
if the set of actions of player 2 is a singleton, J = {∗}). Let G1 ⊂ G be the set of
player 1 problems. Then, for each g ∈ G1, each information structure u, val (g, u)
is the maximal expected payoff of player 1 in problem g. Let
(3.2) d1 (u, v) := sup
g∈G1
|val (u, g)− val (v, g)| ≤ d (u, v) .
Analogously, we can define d2 (u, v) as the distance measured using only player 2
single agent problems.
A simple consequence of the definition is that the single-agent distance depends
only on the distribution of the posterior beliefs of player 1 about the state. For each
u ∈ U , let u˜ ∈ ∆(∆(K)) denote the distribution of the posterior beliefs of player 1
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about the state induced by u, and D be the set of suprema of affine functions from
∆(K) to [−1, 1]. Then, one shows that
(3.3) d1(u, v) = sup
f∈D
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
p∈∆(K)
f(p)du˜(p)−
∫
p∈∆(K)
f(p)dv˜(p)
∣∣∣∣∣ .
A natural question is when the two distances are equal, or, alternatively, when
the maximum in (2.1) is attained by the single-agent problems. The next result
provides a partial answer to this question. For any structure u ∈ ∆(K × C ×D),
we say that the players information is conditionally independent, if under u, signals
c and d are conditionally independent given k.
Proposition 2. Suppose that u, v ∈ ∆(K × C ×D) are two information structures
with conditionally independent information such that margK×D u = margK×D v.
Then,
d (u, v) = d1 (u, v) .
Proposition 2 says that, given two conditionally independent structures, if the
information of player 2 is the smae, the distance is equal to value of the difference
between the information of player 1. The proof of the Proposition relies on the
characterization from Theorem 1 and it shows that the minimum in the optimization
problem is attained by the same pair of garblings as in the single-agent version of
the problem.
3.2.2. Comparison of information structures. We partially order the information
structures by how good they are for player 1: given u, v in U , say that player 1
prefers u to v, write u  v, if for all g in G, val(u, g) ≥ val(v, g). The order  is
reflexive and transitive (and it is also antisymmetric on U∗). One shows that the
value is monotonic in the information of the players: for any garbling q, player 1
always weakly prefers u to q.u, and u.q to u.
Theorem 1 implies that
u  v ⇐⇒ ∃q1,q2∈Qq1.u = v.q2.
(To see why, notice that u  v is equivalent to the left-hand side of the first
equality in (3.1) must be weakly negative, which is equivalent to the second claim
above.) This characterization was initially obtained in Peski (2008) who generalized
the Blackwell characterization of more informative experiment to the multi-player
setting.
Additionally, we obtain the following Corollary to Theorem 1:
Corollary 3. For all information structures u, v,
(3.4) sup
g∈G
(val(v, g)− val(u, g)) = inf
u′u,v′v
‖u′ − v′‖.
This observation provides an additional interpretation to the characterization
from Theorem 1: the maximum gain from replacing information structure u by v
is equal to the minimum total variation distance between the set of information
structures that are worse than u and those that are better than v.
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3.2.3. The impact of the marginal over K. Among many ways that two informa-
tion structures can differ, the most obvious one is that they may have different
distributions over the states k. In order to capture the impact of such differences,
the next result provides tight bounds on the distance between two type spaces with
a fixed distribution of a state:
Proposition 4. For each p, q ∈ ∆K,
min
u,v:margK u=p,margK v=q
d (u, v) =
∑
k
|pk − qk| ,(3.5)
max
u,v:margK u=p,margK v=q
d (u, v) = 2
(
1− max
p′,q′∈∆K
∑
k
min (pkq
′
k, p
′
kqk)
)
.
If p = q, the upper bound is equal to
max
u,v:margK u=margK v=p
d(u, v) = 2(1−max
k
pk).
The lower bound in (3.5) is reached when the two information structures do not
provide any information to none of the players. The upper bound is reached with
information structures where one player knows the state perfectly, and the other
player does not know anything.
Example 5. Suppose that K = {0, 1}. Fix p, q ∈ ∆K. In such a case, one easily
checks that the maximum in the right hand side is attained by either p′ = q′ = (1, 0),
or p′ = q′ = (0, 1), or p′ = p, q′ = q. It follows that for any two information
structures u, v,
d (u, v) ≤ 2 (1−max (min (p0, q0) ,min (p1, q1) , p0q0 + p1q1)) .
The bound is attained when, for example, u = u¯, v = v and u¯ (k, c, d) = pk 1c=k 1d=0
and v (k, c, d) = qk 1c=0 1d=k for each k, c, d ∈ {0, 1}.
3.2.4. Optimal strategies. Another useful property of the characterization is that
the garblings that solve (3.1) can be used to transform optimal strategies in one
structure to approximately optimal strategies on another structure. More precisely,
we say that strategy σ of player 1 is ε-optimal in game g on structure u if for any
strategy τ of player 2, the payoff of σ against τ is no smaller than val (u, g)− ε. We
similarly define ε-optimal strategies for player 2.
For a strategy σ ∈ Q and a garbling q1 ∈ Q, define σ.q1 in Q by σ.q1(c) =∑
c′ q1(c
′|c)σ(c′) for each signal c: player 1 receives signal c, then selects χ according
to q1(c) and plays σ(χ). We have
Proposition 6. Fix finite u, v and suppose that q1 and q2 are solutions to (3.1).
Then, if σ is an optimal strategy in g on v, then σ.q1 is a 2d (u, v)-optimal strategy
in g on u. Similarly, if τ is optimal for player 2 in g on u, then τ.q2 is 2d (u, v)-
optimal for player 2 in g on v.
4. Value of additional information
An important advantage of our approach is that the distance d (u, v) has a
straightforward interpretation as the maximum willingness to pay to move from
one information structure to another. This allows us to discuss the value of addi-
tional information, which we define as the the distance between structures with or
without an extra piece of information.
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4.1. Value of additional information: games vs. single agent. Consider two
information structures
u ∈ ∆(K × (C × C′)×D) ,
v = margK×C×D u.
The structure u is the same as v, but where player 1 can observe an additional
signal c′. Because u represents more information, u is (weakly) more valuable, and
the value of the additional information is defined as d (u, v) , i.e., the tight upper
bound on the gain from the additional signal. A corollary to Proposition 2 shows
that if the signals of the two players ate independent conditionally on the state, the
gain from the new information is the largest in the single-agent problems.
Corollary 7. Suppose that information in u (and therefore in v) is conditionally
independent. Then,
d (u, v) = d1 (u, v) .
The next example illustrates that the thesis of Proposition 7 does not hold
without a conditional independence.
Example 8. Suppose that C = {∗} ,K = D = C′ = {0, 1}, and
u (k, d, c′) =
{
1
4
k+c′
2 , if d = 1,
1
4
(
1− k+c
′
2
)
, if d = 0.
Then, the new information c′ is independent from k, but d is both correlated with
k and c′. Because c′ is independent from the state, the value of new information in
player 1 single-agent problem is 0:
d1 (u, v) = 0.
However, signal c′ provides non-trivial information about the signal of the other
player, hence it is valuable in some games. It is easily seen from 1 that d(u, v) > 0.
Indeed, since u gives player 1 more information, we have
d(u, v) = min
q1,q2
‖u.q2 − q1.v‖,
where q2 : {0, 1} → ∆{0, 1} and q1 ∈ ∆{0, 1}. The existence of a pair (q1, q2) such
that ‖u.q2 − q1.v‖ = 0 is equivalent to the system of equations
∀(k, d, c′) ∈ {0, 1}3, u.q2(k, d, c
′) = v.q1(k, d, c
′),
where the unknowns are q1, q2, and one can check that this system does not admit
any solution. In other words, the information that would be useless in a single-agent
decision problem is valuable in a strategic setting.
A special case of the conditionally independent information is where players
receive multiple samples of independent Blackwell experiments. In an online Ap-
pendix, we show how to compute the value of additional Blackwell experiments.
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4.2. Informational substitutes. Next, we ask two questions about the impact of
a piece of information on the value of another piece of information. Suppose that
u ∈ ∆(K × (C × C1 × C2)×D) ,
v = margK×(C×C1)×D u,
u′ = margK×(C×C2)×D u,
v′ = margK×C×D u.
When moving from v′ to u′ or v to u, player 1 gains an additional signal c2. The
difference is that in the latter case, player 1 has more information that comes from
signal c1. The next result shows the impact of an additional signal on the value of
information.
Proposition 9. Suppose that, under u, c1 is conditionally independent from (c, c2, d)
given k. Then,
d (u′, v′) ≥ d (u, v) .
Given the assumptions, the marginal value of signal c2 decreases when signal c1
is also present. In other words, the two pieces of information are substitutes.
The conditional assumption is equivalent to two simpler assumptions (a) c1 is
conditionally independent from (c, c2) given (k, d), and (b) c1 and d are condition-
ally independent given k. Both (a) and (b) are important as it is illustrated in the
two subsequent examples.
Example 10. Violation of (a). Suppose that C = D = {∗}, K = C1 = C2 =
{0, 1}, c1 and c2 are uniformly and independently distributed, and k = c1 + c2
mod 2. Then, signal c2 is itself independent from the state, hence useless without
c1. Knowing c1 and c2 means knowing the state, which is, of course, very valuable.
Thus, the value of c2 increases when c1 is also present.
Example 11. Violation of (b). Suppose that C = {∗},K = C1 = C2 = D = {0, 1},
c1 and d are uniformly and independently distributed, c2 = d, and k = c1 + d
mod 2. Notice that part (a) of the assumption holds (given (k, d), both signals c1
and c2 are constant, hence, independent), but part (b) is violated. Again, signal
c2 is useless alone, but together with c1 it allows the determine the state and the
information of the other player.
4.3. Informational complements. Another question is about the impact of an
information of the other player on the value of information. Suppose that
u ∈ ∆(K × (C × C1)× (D ×D1)) ,
v = margK×C×(D×D1) u,
u′ = margK×(C×C1)×D u,
v′ = margK×C×D u.
When moving from v′ to u′ or v to u, in both cases, player 1 gains an additional
signal c1. However, in the latter case, player 2 has an additional information that
comes from signal d1. The next result shows the impact of the opponent’s signal
on the value of information.
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Proposition 12. Suppose that (c, c1) and d are conditionally independent given k.
Then,
d (u′, v′) ≤ d (u, v) .
Given the assumptions, signal c1 becomes more valuable when the opponent has
also an access to additional information. Hence, the two pieces of information are
complements.
Example 13. The independence assumptions are important. Suppose that C =
{∗} and K = D = D1 = C1 = {0, 1}. The state is drawn uniformly. Signal
d is equal to the state with probability 23 and signal d1 is equal to the state for
sure. Finally, c1 = 1 iff d = k. In other words, player 2’s signal d is an imperfect
information about the state. Signal c1 carries information about the quality of the
signal of player 1. Such signal is valuable in some games, hence d (u′, v′) > 0. In
the same time, if player 2 learns the state perfectly, signal c becomes useless, and
d (u, v) = 0. (The last claim can be formally proven using Proposition 14 below.)
4.4. Value of joint information. Finally, we consider a situation where two play-
ers receive additional information simultaneously. We ask when the joint informa-
tion contained in signals of two players is (not) valuable. We need the following
definition. Consider a distribution µ ∈ ∆(X × Y × Z) over countable spaces. We
say that random variables x and y are ε-conditionally independent given z if∑
z
µ (z)
∑
x,y
|µ (x, y|z)− µ (x|z)µ (y|z)| ≤ ε.
Let
u ∈ ∆(K × (C × C1)× (D ×D1)) ,
v = margK×C×Du.
Proposition 14. Suppose that d1 is ε-conditionally independent from k × c given
d, and c1 is ε-conditionally independent from (k, d) given c. Then,
d (u, v) ≤ ε.
Suppose that the new signal of each player is not providing any significant infor-
mation about the state of the world and original information of the other player.
Such a signal would be useless in a single-decision problem. In principle, the new
signals could be useful in a strategic setting as the new signals may be correlated
with each other, and jointly correlated with the old information. (In fact, it is
possible that the new signals, if learned by both players, would completely reveal
the original information. See the example below.) Nevertheless, the Proposition
says that the information that is jointly shared by the two players is not valuable
in the zero-sum games.
Example 15. Let K = {0, 1}. Consider a sequence of information structures
un ∈ ∆(K × {0, ..., n} × {0, ...n+ 1}) and structure u ∈ ∆(K × {0} × {0}) such
that
un (0, l, l) = un (1, l, l+ 1) =
1
2 (n+ 1)
for each l = 0, ..., n,
u (k, 0, 0) =
1
2
for each k = 0, 1.
VALUE-BASED DISTANCE BETWEEN THE INFORMATION STRUCTURES 13
This is illustrated on the Figure below (all lines have equal probability; the dashed
line corresponds to state 0 and the solid line corresponds to state 1).
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The idea is that when n is large, with high probability the players will receive
signals far from 0 and n. These signals convey very little information to the players
and only differ for high-order beliefs.
Notice that the signal of each player is 1n+1 -independent from the state of the
world. The Lemma implies that d (un, u) ≤
2
n+1 → 0. In particular, the information
structures un converge to the structure u, where no player receive any information.
5. Value-based topology
The two previous sections discussed the quantitative aspect of the value-based
distance. Now, we analyze its qualitative aspect: the topological information con-
tained in the distance.
5.1. Universal space of information structures. We begin with recalling rele-
vant facts about the universal type spaces. A (Mertens-Zamir) universal type space
is a pair of compact metric spaces Θ1 and Θ2 with respect to the following property:
for each i, there exists a homeomorphism φi : Θi → ∆(K ×Θ−i). The universal
type space is unique (up to homeomorphism). The spaces Θi are constructed as sets
of coherent sequences of finite hierarchies of beliefs. The topology on the universal
type space is also is referred to as the product topology; the latter name comes
from the fact that it can be defined as the Tichonof’s topology on the sequences of
finite hierarchies.
For each Harsanyi type space (even uncountable), there is a belief-preserving
mapping that uniquely maps the types into the associated hierarchies. And so, if
u ∈ ∆(K × C ×D) is an information structure, the signals c and d are mapped
into hierarchies c˜ ∈ Θ1 and d˜ ∈ Θ2. The mapping induces a probability distribution
u˜ ∈ ∆Θ1 over the hierarchies of beliefs of player 1 (and an analogous object for
player 2). Let Π0 = {u˜ : u ∈ U} be the space of all such distributions. The closure of
Π0 (in the weak topology) is denoted as Π. Using the Mertens-Zamir’s terminology,
Π is the set of consistent (Borel) probabilities over the universal type space, and
Π0 is the subset of elements of Π with at most countable support. The space Π is
compact metric and Π0 is dense in Π (see corollary III.2.3 and theorem III.3.1 in
Mertens et al. (2015)).
VALUE-BASED DISTANCE BETWEEN THE INFORMATION STRUCTURES 14
On the other hand, each P ∈ Π can be treated as a common prior type space
with types in sets Θi. The common prior is generated as follows. First, a type θ1 of
player 1 is drawn from distribution P . Then, a state k and a type θ2 of player 2 is
drawn from distribution φ1 (θ1). For each zero-sum game g ∈ G, Proposition III.4.2
in Mertens et al. (2015) shows that one can find its value on P that we denote as
val (P, g). In particular, we can define the value based distance (2.1) over elements
of Π.
There are two fundamental observations. First, by Proposition III.4.4 in Mertens et al.
(2015),
val(u, g) = val(u˜, g) for each u ∈ U .
In particular, the value on information structure u depends only on the induced dis-
tribution over hierarchies of beliefs. Second, by lemma 41 in Gossner and Mertens
(2001)), the value separates the elements of Π: we have
d (P,Q) > 0 for any P,Q ∈ Π, P 6= Q.
The two fundamental observations imply that there is a bijection between the set
of Π0 and the set U
∗ of equivalence classes of information structures.
5.2. The weak vs. the value-based topology. The next result says the spaces
Π0 and the set U
∗ have the same topologies.
Theorem 16. A sequence (un) in U
∗ converges to u ∈ U∗ for the value-based
distance if and only if the sequence (u˜n) converges weakly to u˜ in Π0.
The result says that a convergence in value-based topology to a countable struc-
ture is equivalent to the convergence in distribution of finite-order hierarchies of
beliefs. Informally, at least around countable structures, the higher-order beliefs
have diminishing importance.
We describe the idea of the proof when u is finite. In such a case, we surround
the hierarchies c˜ for c ∈ C by sufficiently small and disjoint neighborhoods, so that
all hierarchies in the neighborhood of c˜ have similar beliefs about the state and the
opponent. We do alike for the other player. The weak convergence ensures that
the converging structures assign large probability to the neighborhoods. Finally,
we show that any information about players hierarchy beyond the neighborhood
to which it belongs is almost conditionally independent (in the sense of Section
4) from the information about the state and the opponents neighborhoods. This
allows us to utilize Proposition 14 (or, more precisely, a part of its proof) to show
that only the information about neighborhoods matter, and the latter is similar to
the information in the limit structure u. If u is countable, we also show that it can
be appropriately approximated by finite structures.
A reader may find such a result surprising, given the message of the strategic dis-
continuities literature (Rubinstein (1989), Dekel et al. (2006), Weinstein and Yildiz
(2007), Ely and Peski (2011), etc.). In that literature, the convergence of finite-
order hierarchies does not imply strategic convergence even around finite structures
(for instance, see Example 18 below). There are multiple ways in which our setting
differs. First, we rely on ex ante equilibrium concept, rather than interim rational-
izability. We are also interested in the payoff comparison rather than the behavior.
Second, we restrict attention to common prior type spaces. Finally, we restrict
attention to zero-sum games.
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We believe that the last restriction makes the key difference. As we explain in
Section 7.1 below, the ex ante focus and payoff comparison but without restriction
to zero-sum games lead to a topology that is significantly finer than the weak
topology. The role of common prior is less clear. On one hand, Lipman (2003)
imply that, at least from the interim perspective, common prior does not generate
significant restrictions on finite order hierarchies. On the other hand, we rely on
the ex ante perspective, and common prior is definitely important for Proposition
14 that plays an important role in the proof.
Finally, we want to emphasize that Theorem 16 does not mean that the higher-
order beliefs do not matter at all. In fact, this result does not hold anymore if the
limit u is an uncountable information structure, as illustrated in Section 6.
5.2.1. Approximate knowledge and approximate common knowledge. Here, we de-
scribe an important application of Theorem 16. Recall that one of the initial im-
pulses of the literature on the higher-order beliefs was the realization of the differ-
ence between the approximate knowledge and the approximate common knowledge.
Here, we are going to show that, at least when it comes to the knowledge of the
payoff state, the difference is not important for zero-sum games.
An information structure u ∈ ∆(K × C ×D) exhibits ε-knowledge of the state
if there is a mapping κ : C ∪D → K such that
u
(
{u({k = κ(c)}|c) ≥ 1− ε}
)
≥ 1−ε and u
(
{u({k = κ(d)}|d) ≥ 1− ε}
)
≥ 1−ε.
In other words, the probability that any of the player player assigns at least 1 − ε
to some state is at least 1− ε.
Proposition 17. Suppose that u exhibits ε-knowledge of the state and that v ∈
∆(K ×KC ×KD), where KC = KD = K and margK v = margK u, and v (k = kC = kD) =
1. (In other words, v is a common knowledge structure with the only information
about the state.) Then,
d (u, v) ≤ 20ε.
Thus, approximate knowledge structures are close to common knowledge struc-
tures. The convergence of approximate knowledge type spaces to the approximate
common knowledge is a consequence of Theorem 16. The metric bound stated in
the Proposition requires a separate (simple) proof based on Proposition 14.
Example 18. Consider a Rubinstein email-game information structures up,α de-
fined as follows: The state is k = 1 with probability p and k = 0 with the remaining
probability. If the state is 0, both players receive signal 0. If the state is 1, player
1 learns that and sends a message to the opponent, who after receiving it, immedi-
ately sends it back. The message travels back and forth. Each round, the message
may get lost before reaching the target with probability α, in which case the process
stops. The signal of the player is the number of the times she sends a message away.
Player 1 always knows the state. Player 2’s first order belief attach the proba-
bility of at least 11+α p1−p
to one of the states. Proposition 17 implies that, when
α→ 0, the Rubinstein’s information structures converge to the common knowledge
of the state.
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6. Large space of information structures
In this section, we show that the value-based distance does not have a compact
completion, or more precisely, it is not totally bounded on U∗. Informally, the
space of information structures is large: it cannot be approximated by finitely
many structures. We use this result to provide a negative answer to a problem
posed by J.F. Mertens.
6.1. (U∗, d) is not totally bounded. To focus attention, we assume that K =
{0, 1}. This is without loss of generality, as our negative result for K = {0, 1}
clearly implies a negative result for larger K.
The next result finds ε > 0 and an infinite sequence of (finite) information
structures such that all of them are at least ε-away from each other in the value-
based distance.
Theorem 19. There exists ε > 0, even N <∞, and a Markov chain of distribution
µ over sequences
k, c1, d1, c2, d2, c3, ...
where Cl = Dl = {1, ..., N} and cl ∈ Cl, dl ∈ Dl for each l ≥ 1, such that, if we
define sets of signals Cl =
∏l
p=1 Cp, D
l =
∏l
p=1Dp and information structures
ul = margK×Cl×Dl µ,
then, for any p 6= l,
d
(
ul, up
)
> ε.
Recall that a consistent probability over the universal type space is a probability
distribution over hierarchies of beliefs that can be induced by some (potentially
uncountable) common prior type space, and that the set Π of consistent proba-
bilities over the universal belief space is compact under the topology of the weak
convergence. Theorem 19 implies that (Π0, d) and therefore (Π, d) are not totally
bounded metric spaces, so that (Π, d) is not a compact metric space. It follows that
the value-based topology on Π is different from the weak topology, even if these
topologies coincide on Π0 by Theorem 16. (We elaborate further on this point in
section 7.2.)
The proof, with an exception of one step that we describe below, is constructive.
The first part of the theorem describes the properties of the construction. We
define a Markov chain that starts with a state followed by alternating signals for
each player. In structure un, player 1 observes signals (c1, c2, ...., cn) and player 2
observes (d1, d2, ...., dn). Thus, the sequence of structures u
n can be understood
as fragments of a larger information structure, where progressively, more and more
information is revealed to each player. The Theorem shows that the larger structure
is not the limit of its fragments in the value-based distance. In particular, there is
no analog of the martingale convergence theorem for the value-based distance for
such sequences.
This has to be contrasted with two other settings, where the martinagle conver-
gence holds. First, in the 1-player case, any sequence of information structures in
which the player is receiving more and more signals converges for the distance d1
(which can be proved using formula (3.3)). Second, using martingale convergence
theorems and arguing in the proof of the denseness of Π0 in Π for the weak topology
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(see e.g. Thm III.3.1 and Lemma III.3.2 in Mertens et al. (2015)), one shows that
u˜n converges µ˜ in Π in the weak topology.
The Markov property means that (a) the state is independent from all players
information conditionally on c1, and (b) each new piece of information is inde-
pendent from the previous pieces of information conditionally on the most recent
information of the other player. As we show in the Appendix D.2, this ensures
that the n-th level hierarchy of beliefs of any type in structure un is preserved by
all consistent types in structures um for m ≥ n. Theorem 19 exhibits therefore a
situation in which higher-order beliefs do not have diminishing importance for the
value-based distance. In particular, it shows that the knowledge of the n-th level
hierarchy of beliefs for any arbitrarily high n is not sufficient to play ε-optimally in
any finite zero-sum game g ∈ G.
6.2. Comments on the proof. We briefly sketch the main ideas behind the proof.
We fix α < 125 . We show that we can find even N high enough and a set S ⊆
{1, ..., N}
2
with certain mixing properties:
|{j : (i, j) ∈ S}| =
N
2
, for each i,
|{i : (i, j) ∈ S}| ∼
N
2
, for each j,
|{i : (i, j) , (i, j′) ∈ S}| ∼
N
4
, for each j, j′,
|{i : (i, j) , (i, j′) , (l, i) ∈ S}| ∼
N
8
, for each j, j′, l,
etc. The “∼” means that the left-hand side is within α-related distance to the
right-hand side. Altogether, there are 8 properties of this sort (see Appendix D.4
for details.) The properties essentially mean that various sections of S are “uncor-
related” with each other.
Although it might be possible to directly construct S with the required prop-
erties, we are unable to do so. Instead, we show the existence of set S using
the probabilistic method of P. Erdős (for a general overview of the method, see
Alon and Spencer (2008)). Suppose that the sets S (i) for i = 1, ..., N are chosen
independently and uniformly from all N2 -element subsets of {1, ..., N}. We show
that if N is sufficiently large, then the set S = {(i, j) : j ∈ S (i)} satisfies the re-
quired properties with positive probability, proving thus that a set satisfying these
properties exists. Our method of the proof is not particularly careful about the
optimal N and a rough estimate suggests that it needs N ≥ 108.
Given S, we construct the Markov chain of distribution µ. First, c1 is chosen
from the uniform distribution on {1, ..., N}. Next, we choose k = 1 with probability
c1
N+1 and k = 0 with the remaining probability. Next, inductively, for each l ≥ 1,
we choose
• dl uniformly from set S (cl) = {j : (cl, j) ∈ S} and conditionally indepen-
dently from k, ..., dl−1 given cl, and
• cl+1 uniformly from set S (dl) and conditionally independently from k, ..., cl
given dl.
Thus, the Markov chain becomes time-homogenuous after the choice of state k and
c1. This finishes the construction of the information structures.
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To provide a lower bound on the distance between different information struc-
tures, we construct a sequence of games. In game gn, player 1 is supposed to reveal
the first n pieces of her information; player 2 reveals the first n − 1 pieces. The
payoffs are such that it is a dominant strategy for player 1 to precisely reveal his
first order belief about the state, which amounts to report truthfully c1. Further
than that, we verify whether the sequence of reports(
cˆ1, dˆ1, ..., cˆn−1, dˆn−1, cˆn
)
belongs to the support of the distribution of the Markov chain µ. If it does, then
player 1 receives payoff ε ∼ 1
10(N+1)2
. If it doesn’t, we identify the first report in
the sequence that deviates from the support. The responsible player is punished
with payoff −5ε (and the opponent receives 5ε).
The payoffs and the mixing properties of matrix S ensure that players have
incentives to report their information truthfully. We check it formally, and we
show that that if l > p, then
d
(
ul, up
)
≥ val
(
ul, gp+1
)
− val
(
up, gp+1
)
≥ 2ε.
6.3. An open problem raised by Mertens. Because the n-th level hierarchies
of beliefs become constant as we move along the sequence un, it must be7 that the
sequence u˜n converges weakly in Π to the limit
u˜n → µ˜.
(The limit is the consistent probability obtained from the type space over infinite
sequences with common prior µ.) Despite the convergence, our Theorem shows
that
lim sup
n
sup
g∈G
|val (µ, g)− val (un, g)| = lim sup
n
d(u˜n, µ˜) ≥ ε.
In particular, the family of functions (u 7→ val(u, g))g∈G is not equicontinuous on
Π for the weak topology.
This answers negatively the second of the three problems8 posed by Mertens
(1986) in his Repeated Games survey from ICM: “This equicontinuity or Lisp-
chitz property character is crucial in many papers...”. Precisely, if this family was
equicontinuous, a direct application of Ascoli’s theorem would have implied that
the family (u 7→ val(u, g))g∈G is totally bounded in the space of bounded functions
over Π endowed with the uniform norm.
The importance of the Mertens question comes from its application to limit theo-
rems in the repeated games. Consider a general zero-sum repeated game (stochastic
game, with incomplete information, and imperfect monitoring), given by a transi-
tion q : K × I × J −→ ∆(K × C ×D), a payoff function g : K × I × J −→ [−1, 1]
and an initial probability u0 in ∆(K × C ×D), where K, I, J , C and D are finite
sets. Before stage 1, an initial state k1 in K and initial private signals c1 ∈ C for
player 1, and d1 ∈ D for player 2, are selected according to u0. Then at each stage
7 As mentioned earlier, this convergence can also be proved by using martingale convergence
theorems.
8Problem 1 asked for the convergence of the value functions (vλ)λ and (vn)n in a general
zero-sum repeated game with finitely many states, actions and signals, and was disproved in
Ziliotto (2016). Problem 3 asks if the existence of a uniform value follows from the uniform
convergence of (vλ), and was disproved in Lehrer and Monderer (1994) for 1-player games, see
also Monderer and Sorin (1993).
VALUE-BASED DISTANCE BETWEEN THE INFORMATION STRUCTURES 19
t, simultaneously player 1 chooses an action it in I and player 2 chooses and action
j − t in J , the stage payoff is g(kt, it, jt), an element (kt+1, ct+1, dt+1) is selected
according to q(kt, it, jt), the new state is kt+1, player 1 receives the signal ct+1,
player 2 the signal dt+1, and the play proceeds to stage t+ 1.
An appropriate state variable is ut ∈ ∆
(
K ×
(
It−1 × Ct
)
×
(
J t−1 ×Dt
))
, rep-
resenting the current state in K and the finite sequence of private actions and
signals previously received by each player. As a consequence, a recursive for-
mula can be explicitly written as follows: for all discount factors δ < 1 and all
u ∈ ∆(K × C0 ×D0),
vδ(u; g, q) = max
σ1:C0→∆(I)
min
σ2:D0→∆(J)
(1− δ) γu,g(σ1, σ2) + δvδ(F (u, σ1, σ2; q); g, q),
= min
σ2:D0→∆(J)
max
σ1:C0→∆(I)
(1− δ) γu,g(σ1, σ2) + δvδ(F (u, σ1, σ2; q); g, q),
where σ1, σ2 are strategies in the game, γu,g(σ1, σ2) is the stage game payoff, and
F (u, σ1, σ2; q) ∈ ∆(K × (C0 × I × C)× (D0 × J ×D)) is the information struc-
ture obtained tomorrow, given today’s strategies, the state transition and signal
function q. Formally,
F (u, σ1, σ2; q) (k, c0, i, c, d0, j, d) =
∑
k′∈K
u (k′, c0, d0) σ1 (i|c0)σ2 (j|d0) q (k|k
′, i, j) .
Proposition 20. Suppose that the family of information structures U0 ⊆ U is
totally bounded for the value-based distance d. Suppose that for some stochastic
game (g, q), any strategies σ1, σ2, we have
u ∈ U0 =⇒ F (u, σ1, σ2; q) ∈ U0 .
Then, the family (vδ (.; g, q))δ∈[0,1) is totally bounded in the space of bounded func-
tions on U0 endowed with the uniform norm.
Proof. Let U∗0 ⊂ U
∗ be the set of equivalence classes of information structures in
U0. The metric space (U
∗
0, d) being totally bounded, its completion (U
∗
0, d) is a
compact metric space. The functions vδ are, by construction, 1-Lipschitz from
(U∗0, d) to [−1, 1]. Hence any function vδ admits a unique 1-Lipschitz extension
on U
∗
0. Ascoli’s theorem implies that the family (vδ)δ∈[0,1) is totally bounded in
the space of bounded functions on (U0, d) endowed with the uniform norm, which
implies the result. 
The above result might seem quite weak, but it is the first necessary step for
proving that vδ converges uniformly when δ goes to 1. This condition was shown
to be sufficient for general Markov Decision Problems in Renault (2011), and his
main theorem (together with the Tauberian theorem of Lehrer and Sorin (1992))
implies quite directly the following corollary.
Corollary 21. In addition to the assumptions of Proposition 20, assume that the
transition q of the stochastic game does not depend on the action of player 2, then
the family vδ converges uniformly to a limit v on U0 as δ goes to 1.
The existence of a limit value attracted a lot of attention since the first results by
Aumann and Maschler (1995) and Mertens and Zamir (1971) for repeated games,
and by Bewley and Kohlberg (1976) for stochastic games. Once the fact that the
family of value functions is totally bounded is established, the existence of the
limit value is typically obtained by showing that there is at most one accumulation
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point of the family (vδ), e.g. by showing that any accumulation point satisfies
a system of variational inequalities admitting at most one solution (see e.g. the
survey Laraki and Sorin (2015) and footnote 2 for related works).
Even if the answer to Mertens’ problem is negative, identifying totally bounded
subsets of (U∗, d) might have applications for limit theorems for repeated games
for which the hypothesis of Proposition 20 applies. The next section illustrate with
our notation several known such subsets.
6.4. Totally bounded subsets. In the 1-player case, the characterization 3.3
implies that the set of equivalence classes in U inducing the same distribution of
first order belief of player 1, equipped with the distance d1 can be identified with
the subset of (∆(∆(K)), d˜1) of probabilities with countable support, where d˜1 is
the distance given by right-hand side of (3.3), which metricizes the weak topology
on ∆(∆(K)). The latter being weakly compact, we deduce that (U , d1) is totally
bounded.
For 2 players, every particular subspace U i for i = 1, ..., 4 listed below has been
shown to be totally bounded, each time by identifying U∗i with a subset of a weakly
compact space of probabilities. We only mention the relevant variables used for the
identification and the corresponding space of probabilities.
• Set U1 of information structures where both players receive the same signal: U
∗
1
can be identified with ∆c(∆(K))
9. Here given u in U1, what matters is the induced
law on the common a posteriori of the players on K. Another characterization of
d(u, v) has been obtained in Renault and Venel (2016). let D1 be the subset of
1-Lipschitz functions from ∆(K) to R satisfying
∀p, q ∈ ∆(K), ∀a, b ≥ 0, af(p)− bf(q) ≤ ‖ap− bq‖1.
We have :
∀u, v ∈ U1, d(u, v) = sup
f∈D1
(∫
p∈∆(K)
f(p)du˜(p)−
∫
p∈∆(K)
f(p)dv˜(p)
)
.
• Set U2 of information structures u ∈ ∆(K ×C ×D) where player 1 knows the
signal of player 2, i.e. there exists a map κ : C → D such that u({d = κ(c)}) = 1:
U∗2 can be identified with ∆c(∆c(∆(K))) (see Mertens (1986), Gensbittel et al.
(2014)). Given u ∈ U2, the relevant variable is the induced distribution of the
second order beliefs of player 2.
• Set U3 of independent information structures: U3 is the set of u ∈ U with con-
ditionally independent information. U∗3 can be identified with ∆c(∆(K)×∆(K)).
Given u in U3, the relevant variable is the pair of first order beliefs of the players.
7. Relation to other topologies on U
7.1. Payoff-based distance with non-zero-sum games. It seems natural to
ask about a version of distance (2.1) where we take supremum over all bounded
games, not necessarily zero-sum. In this subsection, we are going to show that such
an approach cannot be useful because so defined measure is equal to its maximum
possible value for almost every pair of information structures.
Formally, a non-zero sum payoff function is a map g : K × I × J → [−1, 1]
2
where I, J are finite sets. Let Eq (u, g) ⊆ R2 be the set of Bayesian Nash payoffs in
9 We use the notation ∆c(X) for the probabilities with at most countable support on X
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game g on information structure u. Assume that the space R2 is equipped with the
maximum norm dmax (x, y) = maxi=1,2 |xi − yi| and the space of compact subsets
of R2 with the induced Hausdorff distance dHmax. Let
dNZS (u, v) = sup
g is a non-zero-sum payoff function
dHmax (Eq (u, g) ,Eq (v, g)) .
Then, clearly as in our original definition (2.1), 0 ≤ dNZS (u, v) ≤ 2.
Contrary to the value in the zero-sum game, the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
payoffs on information structure u cannot be factorized through the distribution
u˜ ∈ ∆(Θ1) over the hierarchies of beliefs induced by u. For this reason, we only
restrict our analysis to information structures that are non-redundant, or equiv-
alently information structures induced by a coherent probability with countable
support in Π0. That is not because we think that the redundant information is
not relevant (it is relevant for Bayesian Nash equilibrium, see multiple examples in
Dekel et al. (2006), Ely and Peski (2006)), but because the dependence of the BNE
on the redundant information is not yet well-understood (see Sadzik (2008))10.
Let u ∈ ∆(K × C ×D) be an information structure. A subset A ⊆ K × I ×J is
a proper common knowledge event if u (A) ∈ (0, 1) and for each signal s ∈ C ∪D,
u (A|s) ∈ {0, 1}. An information structure is simple if it does not have a proper
common knowledge component. Each finite non-redundant information structure u
has a representation as a convex combination of (non-redundant) simple information
structures u =
∑
α pαuα, where
∑
pα = 1, pα ≥ 0, and pα > 0 for at most finitely
many α.
Theorem 22. Suppose that u, v are finite and non-redundant information struc-
tures. If u and v are simple, then
dNZS (u, v) =
{
0, if u˜ = v˜,
2 otherwise.
More generally, suppose that u =
∑
pαuα and v =
∑
qαvα are the decompositions
into simple information structures. We can always choose the decompositions so
that u˜α = v˜α for each α. Then,
dNZS (u, v) =
∑
α
|pα − qα| .
The distance between the two non-redundant simple information structures is
binary, either 0 if the information structures are equivalent, or 2 if they are not. In
particular, the distance between most of the simple information structures is equal
to its maximum possible value 2. The distance dNZS between two non-redundant,
but not necessarily simple information structures depends on how similar is their
decomposition into the simple components.
The proof in the case of two non-redundant and simple structures u and v is
very simple. Let u˜ 6= v˜. First, it is well-known that there exist a finite game
g : K × I × J → [−1, 1]2 in which each type of player 1 in the support of u˜ and v˜
reports her hierarchy of beliefs as the unique rationalizable action. Second, Lemma
III.2.7 in Mertens et al. (2015) (or corollary 4.7 in Mertens and Zamir (1985)) shows
that the supports of distributions u˜ and v˜ must be disjoint (it is also a consequence of
10An alternative approach would be to take an equilibrium solution concept that can be fac-
torized through the hierarchies of beliefs. An example is Bayes Correlated Equilibrium from
Bergemann and Morris (2015).
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the result by Samet (1998)). Thus, we can construct a game, in which, additionally
to the first game, player 2 chooses between two actions {u, v} which influences
her payoff only, in such a way that it is optimal for her to match the information
structure to which player 1’s reported type belongs. Finally, we multiply the so
obtained game by ε > 0 and construct a new game, in which, additionally, player 1
receives payoff 1− ε if player 2 chooses u and a payoff of −1+ ε if player 2 chooses
v. Hence, the payoff distance between the two information structures is at least
2− ε, where ε is arbitrary small.
7.2. Pointwise topology. An alternative way to define the topology (but not the
distance) on the space of information structures would be through the convergence
of values. Say that a sequence of information structures un converges to u pointwise
if for all payoff structures g ∈ G, limn→∞ val(un, g) = val(u, g). Note that pointwise
convergence is also well-defined on Π.
The topology of pointwise convergence is the weakest topology that makes the
value mappings continuous. This property is not as easy to interpret and it does
not seem to be as useful as the value-based metric induced topology. The next
result provides its characterization.
Theorem 23. Sequence un of information structures converges pointwise to u if
and only if d (un, u) → 0. In other words, the topology of pointwise convergence
and the value-based topology coincide on U∗ and they are homeomorphic to the
weak topology on Π0.
The topology of weak convergence on Π coincides with the topology of pointwise
convergence.
Proof. The Theorem follows from the observations made in Section 5.1. On one
hand, lemma 41 of Gossner and Mertens (2001) implies that the weak topology on
Π is coarser than the topology of weak convergence. On the other hand, because
the value is continuous (Lemma 2 in Mertens (1986) or Proposition III.4.3. in
Mertens et al. (2015)), the two topologies are equivalent. 
Theorem 23 suggests a possible alternative construction of the set Π of consistent
probability over the universal belief space. The alternative construction is simply
based on the values of finite zero-sum Bayesian games.
7.3. Strategic topologies. Following Dekel et al. (2006), the literature studies
the robustness of the behavior with respect to beliefs in a systematic way. A
typical approach is to define the ε-ICR as the outcome of the iterated elimination
procedure, where, at each stage of the elimination, players actions must be ε-best
responses to the conjectures that allow for arbitrary correlations with the state of
the world and that assign probability 1 to actions that survived the previous stage.
This solution concept depends only on the hierarchy of beliefs. One defines two
topologies (see Chen et al. (2016)):
• sequence of types (i.e., hierarchies of beliefs) tn converges to t in the weak
strategic topology if and only if
✿✿✿
for
✿✿✿✿
each
✿✿✿✿✿
game
✿
G, the set of actions that are
0-ICR at type t in game G is equal to the set of actions such that
✿✿✿
for
✿✿✿✿
each
ε > 0,
✿✿✿✿✿
there
✿✿✿✿✿✿
exists
✿
N such that for each n ≥ N , the action is ε − ICR at
type tn in game G, and
• sequence of types (i.e., hierarchies of beliefs) tn converges to t in the uniform
strategic topology if and only if
✿✿
for
✿✿✿✿✿
each ε > 0
✿
,
✿✿✿✿✿
there
✿✿✿✿✿
exists
✿
Nsuch that
✿✿
for
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✿✿✿✿
each
✿✿✿✿✿
game
✿
G (with payoffs bounded in norm by 1), the set of actions that
are 0-ICR at type t in game G is equal to the set of actions that are ε−ICR
at type tn for n ≥ N .
The two topologies differ by the order of quantifiers; the uniform topology cor-
responds more to the value-based distance topology and the weak topology cor-
responds to the topology introduced in Section 7.2. Both topologies are metric.
Chen et al. (2016) provide a full characterization of the two topologies directly in
terms of hierarchies of beliefs. In particular, it is well-known that the two topologies
are strictly finer than the product topology on the universal type space.
It is not entirely obvious how to compare the value-based and the strategic
topologies as, due to the difference between ex ante and interim approaches, their
domains are different.
One way to do is to equip Θ1 with the strategic or uniform strategic topology,
and to consider the induced weak topology (i.e. of convergence in distribution) on
Π ⊂ ∆(Θ1).
One can easily see that the two topologies are strictly finer than the weak topol-
ogy on Π0 (this is demonstrated by, for instance the Rubinstein’s email game -
see Example 18). Given Theorem 16, the two strategic topologies are strictly finer
than the value-based topology on Π0. We do not know whether the two topologies
remain finer when the value-based topology is extended to Π.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced and analyzed the value-based distance on the
space of information structures. The main advantage of the definition is that it has
a simple and useful interpretation as the tight upper bound on the loss or gain from
moving between two information structures. This allows us to directly apply it to
numerous questions about the value of information, the relation between the games
and single-agent problems, comparison of information structures, etc. Additionally,
we show that the distance contains an interesting topological information. On one
hand, the topology induced on the countable information structures is equivalent
to the topology of weak convergence of consistent probabilities over coherent hier-
archies of beliefs. On the other hand, the set of countable information structures
is not totally bounded for the value-based distance, which solves negatively the
last open question raised in Mertens (1986), with deep implications for stochastic
games.
By restricting our attention to zero-sum games, we were able to re-examine the
relevance of many phenomena observed and discussed in the strategic discontinuities
literature. On one hand, the distinction between the approximate knowledge and
the approximate common knowledge is not important in situations of conflict. On
the other hand, the higher order beliefs matter on some, potentially uncountably
large structures. More generally, we believe that the discussion of the strategic
phenomena on particular classes of games can be fruitful line of future research.
It is not the case that each problem must involve coordination games. Interesting
classes of games to study could be common interest games, potential games, etc. 11
11As an example of work in this direction, Kunimoto and Yamashita (2018) studies an order
on hierarchies and types induced by payoffs in supermodular games.
VALUE-BASED DISTANCE BETWEEN THE INFORMATION STRUCTURES 24
Appendix A. Proofs of Section 3
A.1. Proof of Theorem 1. The proof of Theorem 1 relies on two main aspects:
the two interpretations of a garbling (deterioration of signals, and strategy), and
the minmax theorem.
Part 1. We start with general considerations. Recall that any g ∈ G(L) is
(identified with) a map from K ×N×N→ [−1, 1] such that g(k, i, j) = −1 if i ≥ L
and g(k, i, j) = 1 if i < L and j ≥ L. For u ∈ U and g ∈ G(L), we denote by
γu,g(q1, q2) the payoff of player 1 in the zero-sum game Γ(u, g) when player 1 plays
q1 ∈ Q and player 2 plays q2 ∈ Q. Extending as usual g to mixed actions, we
have: γu,g(q1, q2) =
∑
k,c,d u(k, c, d)g(k, q1(c), q2(d)). For u ∈ U and g ∈ G, the
scalar product 〈g, u〉 =
∑
k,c,d g(k, c, d)u(k, c, d) is well defined, and corresponds
to the expectation of g with respect to u, and to the payoff γu,g(Id, Id), where
Id ∈ Q is the strategy which plays with probability one the signal received. The
map g ∈ G(L) has been extended to K × N×N in such a way that
∀q1 ∈ Q(L), min
q2∈Q(L)
γu,g(q1, q2) = min
q2∈Q
γu,g(q1, q2),
and a similar result for player 1. Therefore, we have for all g ∈ G(L)
val(u, g) = max
σ1∈Q(L)
min
σ2∈Q(L)
γu,g(σ1, σ2) = min
σ2∈Q(L)
max
σ1∈Q(L)
γu,g(σ1, σ2)
= max
σ1∈Q
min
σ2∈Q
γu,g(σ1, σ2) = min
σ2∈Q
max
σ1∈Q
γu,g(σ1, σ2)
Let us now compute the payoff γu,g(q1, q2), for any q1, q2:
γu,g(q1, q2) =
∑
k,c,d
u(k, c, d)g(k, q1(c), q2(d))
=
∑
k,c,d
u(k, c, d)
∑
c′,d′)
q1(c)(c
′)q2(d)(d
′)g(k, c′, d′)
=
∑
k,c′,d′
g(k, c′, d′)
∑
c,d
u(k, c, d)q1(c)(c
′)q2(d)(d
′)
=
∑
k,c′,d′
g(k, c′, d′) ((q1.u.q2) (k, c
′, d′))
= 〈g, q1.u.q2〉.
Consequently, val(u, g) = maxq1∈Qminq2∈Q〈g, q1.u.q2〉 = minq2∈Qmaxq1∈Q〈g, q1.u.q2〉.
Since both players can play the Id strategy in Γ(u, g), we obtain for all u ∈ U and
g ∈ G(L) :
inf
q2∈Q
〈g, u.q2〉 ≤ val(u, g) ≤ sup
q1∈Q
〈g, q1.u〉.
Notice also that for all u, v in U , ‖u− v‖ = supg∈G〈g, u− v〉.
Part 2. We now prove Theorem 1. Take g ∈ G and q1, q2 ∈ Q. Then, val(v.q2, g) ≥
val(v, g) and val(u, g) ≥ val(q1.u, g), which implies
val(v, g)− val(u, g) ≤ val(v.q2, g)− val(q1.u, g) ≤ ‖q1.u− v.q2‖.
Because g and q1, q2 are arbitrary, we obtain
sup
g∈G
(val(v, g)− val(u, g)) ≤ inf
q1∈Q,q2∈Q
‖q1.u− v.q2‖.
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Thus, it remains to prove that
(A.1) inf
q1∈Q,q2∈Q
‖q1.u− v.q2‖ ≤ sup
g∈G
(val(v, g)− val(u, g))
and that the minimum is achieved in the left-hand side. We have
inf
q1∈Q,q2∈Q
‖q1.u− v.q2‖ = inf
q1∈Q,q2∈Q
sup
g∈G
〈g, v.q2 − q1.u〉.
The sets Q are convex and compact in the product topology, the set G is a convex
subset of some linear vector space, the map
(g, (q1, q2))→ 〈g, v.q2 − q1.u〉,
is bilinear and continuous with respect to (q1, q2) ∈ Q
2 for any fixed g ∈ G, and by
Sion’s theorem (see e.g. Sorin Sorin (2002) Proposition A.8):
min
q1∈Q,q2∈Q
sup
g∈G
〈g, v.q2 − q1.u〉 = sup
g∈G
min
q1∈Q,q2∈Q
〈g, v.q2 − q1.u〉.
Inequality (A.1) now follows from :
sup
g∈G
inf
q1∈Q,q2∈Q
〈g, v.q2 − q1.u〉 = sup
g∈G
(
inf
q2∈Q
〈g, v.q2〉 − sup
q1∈Q
〈g, q1.u〉
)
≤ sup
g∈G
(val(v, g)− val(u, g)) .
Finally, if u, v ∈ G(L) for some L ∈ N, the argument of part 2 can be repeated
by replacing Q by Q(L) and G by G(L) since for any q1, q2 ∈ Q(L), we have
‖q1.u−v.q2‖ = supg∈G(L)〈g, q1.u−v.q2〉. Moreover, G(L) is compact for the topology
of pointwise convergence onK×{0, ..., L−1}2, and the map (g, (q1, q2))→ 〈g, v.q2−
q1.u〉 is continuous with respect to g ∈ G(L) for any fixed (q1, q2) ∈ Q(L), implying
that
(A.2) max
g∈G(L)
(val(v, g)− val(u, g)) = min
q1∈Q(L),q2∈Q(L)
‖q1.u− v.q2‖.
Clearly,
sup
g∈G(L)
(val(v, g)− val(u, g)) ≤ sup
g∈G
(val(v, g)− val(u, g)) , and
inf
q1∈Q,q2∈Q
‖q1.u− v.q2‖ ≤ inf
q1∈Q(L),q2∈Q(L)
‖q1.u− v.q2‖.
and using (3.1) and (A.2), these inequalities are equalities, which concludes the
proof.
A.2. Proof of Proposition 2. Let us start with general properties of d1. Let us
define the set of single agent information structures as U1 = ∆(K × N) using the
same convention that countable sets are identified with subsets of N. Note that
given u ∈ ∆(K × C ×D), margK×C u ∈ U1. Let
G′1 = {g
′ : K × N→ [−1, 1], ∃L s.t.∀i ≥ L, g′(k, i) = −1}
be the set of single-agent decision problems, and define for u′, v′ ∈ U1, d
′
1(u
′, v′) =
supg′∈G′1 | val(v
′, g′)−val(u′, g′)|. It is easily seen that for any u, v ∈ ∆(K×C×D),
(A.3) d1(u, v) = d
′
1(u
′, v′) = max{min
q∈Q
‖u′ − q.v′‖,min
q∈Q
‖q.u′ − v′‖}
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where u′ = margK×C u, v
′ = margK×C v, q.u
′(k, c) =
∑
s∈C u
′(k, s)q(s)(c) and
where the last equality can be obtained by mimicking (and simplifying) the argu-
ments of the proof of Theorem 1.
We now prove Theorem 1. Using the assumptions, we have u(k) = v(k),
u (c, d|k) = u (c|k)u (d|k) and v (c′, d|k) = v (d|k) v (c′|k) = u(d|k)v (c′|k). For
any pair of garblings q1, q2
‖u.q2 − q1.v‖ =
∑
k,c,d
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
β
u (k, c, β) q2 (d|β)−
∑
α
v (k, α, d) q1 (c|α)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∑
k,c
u (k)
∑
d
∣∣∣∣∣∣u (c|k)
∑
β
u (β|k) q2 (d|β)−
(∑
α
v (α|k) q1 (c|α)
)
u (d|k)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∑
k,c
u (k)
∑
d
|u (d|k) Γ (k, c) + ∆ (k, d)u (c|k)| ,
where
∆(k, d) = u (d|k)−
∑
β
u (β|k) q2 (d|β) ,
Γ (k, c) =
∑
α
v (α|k) q1 (c|α)− u (c|k) .
Because |x+ y| ≥ |x|+ sgn(x)y for each x, y ∈ R, we have∑
d
|u (d|k) Γ (k, c) + ∆ (k, d)u (c|k)|
≥
∑
d
u (d|k) |Γ (k, c)|+ sgn (Γ (k, c))u (c|k)
∑
d
∆(k, d)
=
∑
d
u (d|k) |Γ (k, c)| .
where the last equality comes from the fact that
∑
d∆(k, d) = 0. Thus, we obtain
‖u.q2 − q1.v‖ ≥
∑
k,c,d
u (k) |u (d|k) Γ (k, c)|
=
∑
k,c,d
u (k)
∣∣∣∣∣u (d|k)u (c|k)−∑
α
u (d|k) v (α|k) q1 (c|α)
∣∣∣∣∣
= ‖u− q1.v‖ .
We deduce that
min
q1,q2
‖u.q2 − q1.v‖ = min
q1
‖u− q1.v‖ .
Inverting the roles of the players, we also have
min
q1,q2
‖v.q2 − q1.y‖ = min
q1
‖v − q1.u‖ .
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We conclude that
d(u, v) = max{min
q1,q2
‖u.q2 − q1.v‖ ; min
q1,q2
‖v.q2 − q1.y‖}
= max{min
q1
‖u− q1.v‖ ; min
q1
‖v − q1.u‖}
= d1(u, v),
where the last equality follows from (A.3) together with the fact that margK×D u =
margK×D v.
A.3. Proof of Corollary 3. By Theorem 1,
sup
g∈G
(val(v, g)− val(u, g)) = min
q1∈Q,q2∈Q
‖q1.u− v.q2‖.
Since q1.u  u and v.q2  v, we have supg∈G (val(v, g)− val(u, g)) ≥ infu′u,v′v ‖u
′−
v′‖. Consider now u′  u and v′  v. We have for all g ∈ G:
‖u′ − v′‖ ≥ val(v′, g)− val(u′, g) ≥ val(v, g)− val(u, g),
so supg∈G (val(v, g)− val(u, g)) ≤ infu′u,v′v ‖u
′ − v′‖. Hence
sup
g∈G
(val(v, g)− val(u, g)) = inf
u′u,v′v
‖u′ − v′‖
A.4. Proof of Proposition 4. We prove the lower bound of (3.5). Let g (k) =
1pk>qk −1pk≤qk . Then,
d (u, v) ≥ val (u, g)− val (v, g) =
∑
k∈K
(pk − qk) g (k) =
∑
k∈K
|pk − qk| .
Let us prove the upper bound of (3.5). Define u¯ and v in ∆(K × KC × KD)
with K = KC = KD such that u¯(k, c, d) = pk 1c=k 1d=k0 for some fixed k0 ∈ K
(complete information for player 1, trivial information for player 2, and the same
prior about k as u) and v(k, c, d) = qk 1c=k0 1d=k for all (k, c, d) (trivial information
for player 1, complete information for player 2, and the same beliefs about k as v).
Since the value of a zero-sum game is weakly increasing with player 1’s information
and weakly decreasing with player 2’s information, we have u  u¯ and v  v.
Therefore,
sup
g∈G
(val(u, g)− val(v, g)) ≤ sup
g∈G
(val(u¯, g)− val(v, g)) = min
q1∈Q,q2∈Q
‖u¯.q2 − q1.v‖,
where, according to Theorem 1, the minimum in the last expression is attained
for garblings with values in ∆K. Since player 2 has a unique signal in u¯, only
q2(.|k0) ∈ ∆K matters. We denote it by q
′ = q2 (.|k0). Similarly, we define p
′ =
q1(.|k0) ∈ ∆(K). Then,
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‖u¯.q2 − q1.v‖ =
∑
(k,c,d)∈K3
|pk 1c=k q
′
d − qk 1d=k p
′
c|
=
∑
k∈K
|pkq
′
k − qkp
′
k|+ pk(1− q
′
k) + qk(1− p
′
k)
= 2 +
∑
k∈K
|pkq
′
k − qkp
′
k| − pkq
′
k − qkp
′
k
= 2
(
1−
∑
k∈K
min (pkq
′
k, qkp
′
k)
)
.
A similar inequality holds by inverting the roles of u and v, and the upper bound
follows from the fact that one can choose arbitrary p′, q′.
If p = q, then∑
k∈K
min (pkq
′
k, qkp
′
k) =
∑
k∈K
pkmin (q
′
k, p
′
k) ≤
∑
k∈K
pkp
′
k ≤ max
k∈K
pk,
where the latter is attained by p′k = q
′
k = 1{k=k∗} for some k
∗ ∈ K such that
pk∗ = maxk∈k pk.
A.5. Proof of Proposition 6. We prove the first claim. Consider any strategy τ
of player 2 in Q. Notice that (σ.q1).u = σ.(q1.u) and (v.q2).τ = v.(τ.q2). Using the
notation of the proof of theorem 1, we have
γu,g(σ.q1, τ) = 〈g, (σ.q1).u.τ〉
= 〈g, σ.(q1.u).τ〉
≥ 〈g, σ.(v.q2).τ〉 − ‖q1.u− v.q2‖
≥ 〈g, σ.v.(τ.q2)〉 − d(u, v)
≥ val(v, g)− d(u, v)
≥ val(u, g)− 2d(u, v),
so σ.q1 is 2d(u, v)-optimal in g on u.
Appendix B. Proofs of Section 4
B.1. Proof of Proposition 9. Because u has more information than v,
d (u, v) = min
q2∈Q
min
q1∈Q
‖u.q2 − q1.v‖ ≤ min
q2∈Q
min
q1:C→∆(C×C1×C2)
‖u.q2 − q1.v‖ ,
where in the second inequality we use a restricted set of player 1’s garblings that do
not depend on c1. Further, for any such q1 and an arbitrary garbling q2, we have
‖u.q2 − q1.v‖ =
∑
k,c,c1,c2,d
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
β
u (k, c, c1, c2, β) q2 (d|β)−
∑
α
u (k, c, c1, d) q1 (c, c2|α)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∑
k,c,c1,c2,d
u (k, c1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
β
u (c, c2, β|k, c1) q2 (d|β)−
∑
α
u (c, d|k, c1) q1 (c, c2|α)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
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Because of the conditional independence assumption, the above is equal to
=
∑
k,c,c2,d
(∑
c1
u (k, c1)
) ∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
β
u (c, c2, β|k) q2 (d|β)−
∑
α
u (c, d|k) q1 (c, c2|α)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∑
k,c,c2,d
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
β
u (k, c, c2, β) q2 (d|β)−
∑
α
u (k, c, d) q1 (c, c2|α)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= ‖u′.q2 − q1.v
′‖ .
Hence,
d (u, v) ≤ min
q2
min
q1:C→∆(C×C1×C2)
‖u′.q2 − q1.v
′‖ = d (u′, v′) .
B.2. Proof of Proposition 12. We have
d (u′, v′) = d1 (u
′, v′) = d1 (u, v) ≤ d (u, v) .
The first equality comes from Proposition 7, and the second from the fact that u
and u′ (resp. v and v′) induce the same distribution on player 1 first order beliefs,
and the inequality from the definition of the two distances.
B.3. Proof of Proposition 14. We have the following Lemma:
Lemma 24. Suppose that c1 is ε-conditionally independent from (k, d) given c.
Then,
sup
g∈G
val (u, g)− val (v, g) ≤ ε.
Proof. Let q2 : D × D1 → D be defined as q2 (d, d1) (d
′) = 1d′=d. Let q1 : C →
C × C1 be defined as q1 (c, c1|c) = u (c1|c). Then,
‖u.q2 − q1.v‖ =
∑
k,c,c1,d
|u (k, c, c1, d)− u (k, c, d)u (c1|c)|
=
∑
c
u (c)
∑
k,c1,d
|u (k, c1, d|c)− u (k, d|c)u (c1|c)| ≤ ε.
The claim follows from Theorem 1. 
An analogous argument shows that, if d1 is ε-conditionally independent from
(k, c) given d, then
sup
g∈G
val (v, g)− val (u, g) ≤ ε.
Appendix C. Proofs of Section 5
C.1. Theorem 16: the weak topology is contained in the value-based
topology. Because the weak topology is metrisable, it is enough to show that if
un ∈ ∆(K × Cn ×Dn) and u ∈ ∆(K × C ×D) are information structures such
that d (un, u) → 0, then u˜n converges to u˜ in the weak topology. Let u˜
∗ be an
accumulation point of sequence u˜n. Such a point exists because Π is compact.
Suppose that u˜∗ 6= u˜. Then, by lemma 41 in Gossner Mertens Gossner and Mertens
(2001)), there is a game g such that |val (u˜, g)− val (u˜∗, g)| > 0. For a fixed game,
val : Π→ [−1, 1] is continuous in the weak topology (see Lemma 2 in Mertens (1986)
or Proposition III.4.3. in Mertens et al. (2015)). It follows that limn |val (u˜, g)− val (u˜n, g)| =
|val (u˜, g)− val (u˜∗, g)| > 0. But this contradicts d (un, u) = d (u˜n, u˜)→ 0.
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C.2. Theorem 16: the value-based topology is contained in the weak
topology. Because the weak topology is metrisable, it is enough to show that if
un ∈ ∆(K × Cn ×Dn) and u ∈ ∆(K × C ×D) are information structures such
that u˜n converges to u˜ in the weak topology, then d (un, u)→ 0. We will show that
for each ε > 0,
(C.1) lim sup
n→∞
sup
g∈G
(val (un, g)− val (u, g)) ≤ 0.
Because we can switch the roles of players, this will suffice to establish our claim.
Partitions of unity. We can without loss of generality assume that u is non-
redundant and all signals c and d have positive probability. We can associate
signals c ∈ C ⊆ N and d ∈ D ⊆ N with the corresponding hierarchies of beliefs in
Θ1 and Θ2. In other words, we identify C ⊆ Θ1 as the (countable) support of u˜ and
D ⊆ Θ2 as the smallest countable set such that for each c ∈ C, φ1 (K ×D|c) = 1
(i.e., D is the union of countable supports of all beliefs of hierarchies in C). For
each c ∈ C and d ∈ D, we denote the corresponding hierarchies under u as c˜ and
d˜. Also, let Cm = C ∩ {0, ...,m} and Dm = D ∩ {0, ...,m}.
Because Θ2 is Polish, for each m ∈ N and each d ∈ D
m, we can find continuous
functions κmd : Θ2 → [0, 1] for m ∈ N, d ∈ {0, ...,m} such that
κmd
(
d˜
)
= 1 for each d ∈ Dm,
κmd ≡ 0 if d /∈ D, and
m∑
d=0
κmd (θ2) = 1 for each θ2 ∈ Θ2.
In other words, for each m, {κmd }0≤d≤m is a continuous partition of unity on space
Θ2 with the property that for each d ∈ D
m, κmd peaks at hierarchy d˜.
Notice that for each c ∈ C, each d ∈ Dp, we have
Eφ1(c˜)[1{k}(.)κ
p
d(.)] ≥ u (k, d|c) ,
and ∑
k∈K
p∑
d=0
∣∣Eφ1(c˜)[1{k}(.)κpd(.)]− u (k, d|c)∣∣ = u(D \Dp|c).
Because all hierarchies c˜, c ∈ C are distinct, for each m, there exists pm < ∞ and
εm ∈
(
0, 1m
)
such that for any c, c′ ∈ Cm such that c 6= c′,
∑
k∈K
pm∑
d=0
∣∣∣Eφ1(c˜)[1{k} κpmd ]− Eφ1(c˜′)[1{k} κpmd ]∣∣∣ ≥ 2εm.
Let
hmc (θ1) =
∑
k
pm∑
d=0
∣∣∣Eφ1(θ1)[1{k} κpmd ]− Eφ1(c˜)[1{k} κpmd ]∣∣∣ .
Then, hmc is a continuous function such that h
m
c (c˜) = 0, and such that if h
m
c (θ1) ≤
εm for some c ∈ Cm, then hmc′ (θ1) ≥ ε
m for any c′ ∈ Cm such that c′ 6= c. Define
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continuous functions for 0 ≤ c ≤ m+ 1,
κmc (θ1) = max
(
1−
1
εm
hmc (θ1) , 0
)
for c ∈ Cm,
κmc ≡ 0 if c /∈ C, and
κmm+1 (θ1) = 1−
m∑
c=0
κmc (θ1) .
Then, for each m,
∑m+1
c=0 κ
m
c ≡ 1, and κ
m
c (θ1) ∈ [0, 1] for each c = 0, ...,m + 1,
which implies that {κmc }0≤c≤m+1 is a continuous partition of unity on space Θ1
such that for each c ∈ Cm, κmc (c˜) = 1.
Conditional independence. For each information structure v ∈ ∆(K × C′ ×D′),
define an information structure
Kmv ∈ ∆(K × C′ × {0, ...,m+ 1} ×D′ × {0, ..., pm})
so that
Kmv
(
k, c′, cˆ, d′, dˆ
)
= v (k, c′, d′)κmcˆ (c˜
′)κp
m
dˆ
(
d˜′
)
.
Let δmv = 2εm +Kmv (cˆ = m+ 1) .
We are going to show that, under Kmv, signal c′ is δmv-conditionally indepen-
dent from
(
k, dˆ
)
given cˆ. Notice first that, if Kmv
(
k, d′, dˆ, c′, cˆ
)
> 0 for some
cˆ ∈ Cm, then hmcˆ (c˜
′) ≤ εm. It follows that
∑
k
pm∑
dˆ=0
∣∣∣Kmv (k, dˆ|cˆ, c′)− Eφ1(˜ˆc)[1{k} κp∗dˆ ]∣∣∣
=
∑
k
pm∑
dˆ=0
∣∣∣Kmv (k, dˆ|c′)− Eφ1(˜ˆc)[1{k}[κpmdˆ ]∣∣∣
=
∑
k
pm∑
dˆ=0
∣∣∣Eφ1(c˜′)[1{k} κpmdˆ ]− Eφ1(˜ˆc)[1{k} κpmdˆ ]∣∣∣ = hmcˆ (c˜′) ≤ εm.
On the other hand
∑
k
pm∑
dˆ=0
∣∣∣Kmv (k, dˆ|cˆ)− Eφ1(˜ˆc)[1{k} κp∗dˆ ]∣∣∣
=
∑
k
pm∑
dˆ=0
∣∣∣∣∣ 1Kmv(cˆ) ∑
c′∈C′
Kmv(c′, cˆ)Kmv
(
k, dˆ|cˆ, c′
)
− Eφ1(˜ˆc)[1{k}[κ
pm
dˆ
]
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
c′∈C′
Kmv(c′, cˆ)
Kmv(cˆ)
∑
k
pm∑
dˆ=0
∣∣∣Kmv (k, dˆ|cˆ, c′)− Eφ1(˜ˆc)[1{k}[κpmdˆ ]∣∣∣ = hmcˆ (c˜′) ≤ εm.
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Hence,
m+1∑
cˆ=1
∑
c′
Kmv (cˆ, c′)
∑
k,dˆ
∣∣∣Kmv (k, dˆ|cˆ, c′)−Kmv (k, dˆ|cˆ)∣∣∣
≤2εm
m∑
cˆ=1
Kmv (cˆ) +Kmv (cˆ = m+ 1) ≤ δmv.
Define the information structure
Lmv = margK×{0,...,pm}×{0,...,m+1}K
mv.
Then, because d (Kmv, v) = 0, Lemma 24 implies that
sup
g∈G
(val (v, g)− val (Lmv, g)) ≤ δmv.
Proof of claim (C.1). Observe that for each k, cˆ, dˆ,
(Lmun)
(
k, cˆ, dˆ
)
= Eu˜n
(
κmcˆ (θ1)Eφ1(θ1)[1{k} κ
pm
dˆ
]
)
.
Because all the functions in the brackets above are continuous, the weak convergence
u˜n → u˜ implies that
(Lmun)
(
k, cˆ, dˆ
)
→ (Lmu)
(
k, cˆ, dˆ
)
.
for each k, cˆ, dˆ. Because the information structures Lmun and L
mu are described
on the same and finite spaces of signals, the pointwise convergence implies
d (Lmun, L
mu) ≤ ‖Lmun − L
mu‖ → 0 as n→∞.
Moreover, if cˆ ∈ Cm and dˆ ∈ Dp
m
, the definitions imply that
(Lmu)
(
k, cˆ, dˆ
)
≥ u
(
k, cˆ, dˆ
)
.
Thus,
d (Lmu, u) ≤ ‖Lmu− u‖ ≤ 2
(
u (C\Cm) + u
(
D\Dp
m
))
−→
n→∞
0.
It follows that
δmun = (K
mun) (cˆ = m+ 1) −→
n→∞
(Lmu) (cˆ = m+ 1) ,
and
(Lmu) (cˆ = m+ 1) = 1−(Lmu)(Cm×Dp
m
) ≤ 1−u(Cm×Dp
m
) ≤ u (C\Cm)+u
(
D\Dp
m
)
.
Together, we obtain for each m,n
sup
g∈G
(val (un, g)− val (u, g))
≤ sup
g∈G
(val (un, g)− val (L
mun, g))
+ sup
g∈G
(val (Lmun, g)− val (L
mu))
+ sup
g∈G
(val (Lmu)− val (u, g))
≤δmun + ‖L
mun − L
mu‖+
(
u (C\Cm) + u
(
D\Dp
m
))
.
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Hence,
lim sup
n→∞
sup
g∈G
(val (v, g)− val (Lmv, g)) ≤ 3
(
u (C\Cm) + u
(
D\Dp
m
))
.
When m→∞, the right hand side converges to 0 as well.
C.3. Proof of Proposition 17. Let u′ ∈ ∆(K × (KC × C)× (KD ×D)) be de-
fined so that u = margK×c×D u
′ and u′({kC = κ (c) , kD = κ (d)}) = 1. Because u
′
does not have any new information, we verify (for instance using Lemma 14) that
d (u, u′) = 0. We are going to show that C is 16ε-conditionally independent from
K ×KD given KC . Notice that because u exhibits ε-knowledge,
u′ {kC 6= k or kD 6= k} ≤ u
′ {kC 6= k}+ u
′ {kD 6= k}
≤ 2ε+ 2ε = 4ε.
Thus,∑
k,kC ,kD
u′ (kC)
∑
c
|u′ (k, kD, c|kC)− u
′ (k, kD|kC)u
′ (c|kC)|
=
∑
k,kC ,kD
u′ (k, kC , kD)
∑
c
∣∣∣∣∣∣u′ (c|k, kC , kD)−
∑
k′,kD ′
u′ (c|k′, kC , k
′
D)u
′ (k′, k′D|kC)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
k
u′ (k, k, k)
∑
c
∣∣∣∣∣∣u′ (c|k, k, k)−
∑
k′,kD′
u′ (c|k′, kC = k, k
′
D)u
′ (k′, k′D|kC = k)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+ 2u′ {kC 6= k or kD 6= k}
≤
∑
k
u′ (k, k, k)
∑
c
∣∣∣∣u′ (c|k, k, k)− u′ (c|k, k, k) u′ (k, k, k)u′ (kC = k)
∣∣∣∣
+
∑
k
u′ (k, k, k)
∑
c
∑
k′ 6=k, or k′
D
6=k
|u′ (c|k, kC = k, kD)u
′ (k′, k′D|kC = k)|
+ 2u′ {kC 6= k or kD 6= k}
≤
∑
k
u′ (k, k, k)
∣∣∣∣1− u′ (k, k, k)u′ (kC = k)
∣∣∣∣+ 3u′ {kC 6= k or kD 6= k}
≤
∑
k
|u′ (kC = k)− u
′ (k, k, k)|+ 3u′ {kC 6= k or kD 6= k}
≤4u′ {kC 6= k or kD 6= k} ≤ 16ε.
Because an analoguous result applies to the information of the other player,
Lemma 14 shows that
d (u′, v′) ≤ 16ε,
where v′ = margK×KC×KD . Because
d (v, v′) ≤
∑
k,kC ,kD
|v (k, kC , kD)− v
′ (k, kC , kD)|
≤2v′ {kC 6= k or kD 6= k} = 2u
′ {kC 6= k or kD 6= k} ≤ 4ε,
the triangle inequality implies that
d (u, v) ≤ d (u, u′) + d (u′, v′) + d (v, v′) ≤ 20ε.
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Appendix D. Proof of Theorem 19.
N is a very large even integer to be fixed later, and we write A = C = D =
{1, ..., N}, with the idea of using C while speaking of actions or signals of player 1,
and using D while speaking of actions and signals of player 2. We fix ε and α, to
be used later, such that
0 < ε <
1
10(N + 1)2
, and α =
1
25
.
We will consider a Markov chain on A, satisfying:
• the law of the first state of the Markov chain is uniform on A,
• for each a in A, there are exactly N/2 elements b in A such that ν(b|a) = 2/N
: given that the current state of the Markov chain is a, the law of the next state is
uniform on a subset of states of size N/2,
• and few more conditions, to be be defined later.
The rest of the proof is split in 4 parts: we first define the information structures
(ul)l≥1 and some payoff structures (g
p)p≥1. Next, we show that the Markov prop-
erty of the construction ensures that the hierarchies of beliefs are preserved. Then
we define two conditions UI1 and UI2 on the information structures and show that
they imply the conclusions of theorem 19. Finally, we show, via the probabilistic
method, the existence of a Markov chain ν satisfying all our conditions.
D.1. Information and payoff structures (ul)l≥1 and (g
l)l≥1. For l ≥ 1, define
the information structure ul ∈ ∆(K × Cl × Dl) by: for each state k in K, signal
c = (c1, ..., cl) in C
l of player 1 and signal d = (d1, ..., dl) in D
l for player 2,
ul(k, c, d) = ν(c1, d1, c2, d2, ..., cl, dl)
(
c1
N + 1
1k=1 +
1− c1
N + 1
1k=0
)
.
The following interpretation of ul holds: first select (a1, a2, ..., a2l) = (c1, d1, ..., cl, dl)
in A2l according to the Markov chain ν (i.e. uniformly among the nice sequences of
length 2l), then tell (c1, c2, ..., cl) (the elements of the sequence with odd indices)
to player 1, and (d1, d2, ..., dl) (the elements of the sequence with even indices) to
player 2. Finally choose the state k = 1 with probability c1/(N + 1), and state
k = 0 with the complement probability 1− c1/(N + 1).
Notice that the definition is not symmetric among players, the first signal c1 of
player 1 is uniformly distributed and plays a particular role. The marginal of ul on
K is uniform, and the marginal of ul+1 over (K ×Cl × V l) holds : condition 2 ) of
theorem 19 is satisfied.
A sequence (a1, ..., al) of length l ≥ 1 is said to be nice it it is in the support
of the Markov chain: ν(a1, ..., al) > 0. For instance any sequence of length 1 is
nice, and N2/2 sequences of length 2 are nice. Consider a sequence (a1, ..., al) of
elements of A which is not nice, i.e. such that ν(a1, ..., al) = 0. We say that the
sequence is not nice because of player 1 if min{t ∈ {1, ..., l}, ν(a1, ..., at) = 0} is
odd, and not nice because of player 2 if min{t ∈ {1, ..., l}, ν(a1, ..., at) = 0} is even.
A sequence (a1, ..., al) is now either nice, or not nice because of player 1, or not
nice because of player 2. A sequence of length 2 is either nice, or not nice because
of player 2.
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For p ≥ 1, define the payoff structure gp : K × Cp ×Dp−1 → [−1, 1] such that
for all k in K, c′ = (c′1, ..., c
′
p) in C
p, d′ = (d′1, ..., d
′
p−1) in D
p−1 :
gp(k, c′, d′) = g0(k, c
′
1) + h
p(c′, d′), with
g0(k, c
′
1) = −
(
k −
u′1
N + 1
)2
+
N + 2
6(N + 1)
,
hp(c′, d′) =

ε if (c′1, d
′
1, ..., c
′
p) is nice,
5ε if (c′1, d
′
1, ..., c
′
p) is not nice because of player 2,
−5ε if (c′1, d
′
1, ..., c
′
p) is not nice because of player 1.
One can check that |gp| ≤ 5/6 + 5ε ≤ 8/9. Regarding the g0 part of the payoff,
consider a decision problem for player 1 where: c1 is selected uniformly in A and
the state is selected to be k = 1 with probability c1/(N + 1) and k = 0 with
probability 1 − c1/(N + 1). Player 1 observes c1 but not k, and he choose c
′
1
in A and receive payoff g0(k, c
′
1). We have
c1
N+1g0(1, c
′
1) + (1 −
c1
N+1 )g0(0, c
′
1) =
1
(N+1)2 (c
′
1(2c1− c
′
1) + (N +1)((N +2)/6− c1)). To maximize this expected payoff,
it is well known that player 1 should play his belief on k, i.e. c′1 = c1. Moreover,
if player 1 chooses c′1 6= c1, its expected loss from not having chosen c1 is at least
1
(N+1)2 ≥ 10ε. And the constant
N+2
6(N+1) has been chosen such that the value of this
decision problem is 0.
Consider now l ≥ 1 and p ≥ 1. By definition, the Bayesian game Γ(uk, gp) is
played as follows: first, (c1, d1, ..., cl, dl) is selected according to the law ν of the
Markov chain, player 1 learns (c1, ..., cl), player 2 learns (d1, ..., dl) and the state is
k = 1 with probability c1/(N+1) and k = 0 otherwise. Then simultaneously player
1 chooses c′ in Cp and player 2 chooses d′ in Dp−1, and finally the payoff to player 1
is gp(k, c′, d′). Notice that by the previous paragraph about g0, it is always strictly
dominant for player 1 to report correctly his first signal, i.e. to choose c′1 = c1. We
will show in the next section that if l ≥ p and player 1 simply plays the sequence
of signals he received, player 2 can not do better than also reporting truthfully his
own signals, leading to a value not lower than the payoff for nice sequences, that
is ε. On the contrary in the game Γ(ul, gl+1), player 1 has to report not only the l
signals he has received, but also an extra-signal c′l+1 that he has to guess. In this
game we will prove that if player 2 truthfully reports his own signals, player 1 will
incur the payoff −5ε with probability at least (approximately) 1/2, and this will
result in a low value. These intuitions will prove correct in the next section, under
some conditions UI1 and UI2.
D.2. Higher order beliefs. Recall that n-order beliefs are defined inductively as
conditional laws. Precisely, the first order beliefs θi1 of player i is the conditional
law of k given her signal. The n-order belief θin of player i is the conditional law of
(ω, θ−in−1) given her signal. In this construction, conditional laws are seen as random
variables taking values in space of probability measures.
Lemma 25. For all l > p, the joint distribution of (ω, θ12p, θ
2
2p) induced by the
information structure ul is independent of l.
Proof. We use the notation L(X |Y ) for the conditional law of X given Y , and the
identification (a1, ..., a2l) = (c1, d1, ...., cl, dl). At first, note that by construction
k and (a2, ...., a2l) are conditionally independent given a1, so that the sequence
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(k, a1, a2, ..., a2l) is a Markov process. It follows that θ
1
1 = L(k|c1, ..., cl) =L(k|c1).
The Markov property implies that
θ21 = L(k|d1, ...., dl) = L(k|d1), θ
2
2 = L(d, θ
1
1(c1)|d1, ...., dl) = L(k, θ
1
1(c1)|d1),
and therefore we have
θ12 = L(k, θ
2
1(d1)|c1, ...., cl) = L(k, θ
2
1(d1)|c1, c2).
By induction, and applying the same argument (future and past of a Markov process
are conditionally independent given the current position), we deduce that for all
n ≥ 1,
θ12n = L(k, θ
2
2n−1|c1, ...., cmin(l,n+1)), θ
1
2n+1 = L(k, θ
2
2n|c1, ...., cmin(l,n+1)),
θ22n−1 = L(k, θ
1
2n−2|d1, ...., dmin(l,n)), θ
2
2n = L(k, θ
1
2n−1|d1, ...., dmin(l,n)).
As a consequence, for all n ≤ p, these conditional laws do not depend on which ul
we are using as soon as l > p. 
D.3. Conditions UI and values. To prove that the intuitions of the previous
paragraph are correct, we need to ensure that players have incentives to report
their true signals, so we need additional assumptions on the Markov chain.
Notations and definition: Let l ≥ 1, m ≥ 0, c = (c1, ..., cl) in C
l and d =
(d1, ..., dm) in D
m. We write :
a2q(c, d) = (c1, d1, ...., cq, dq) ∈ A
2q for each q ≤ min{l,m},
a2q+1(c, d) = (c1, d1, ...., cq, dq, cq+1) ∈ A
2q+1 for each q ≤ min{l − 1,m}.
For r ≤ min{2l, 2m+ 1},
we say that c and d are nice at level r, and we write c ⌣r d, if a
r(c, d) is nice.
In the next definition we consider an information structure ul ∈ ∆(K×Cl×Dl)
and denote by c˜ and d˜ the respective random variables of the signals of player 1
and 2.
Definition 26. We say that the conditions UI1 are satisfied if for all l ≥ 1, all
c = (c1, ..., cl) in C
l and c′ = (c′1, ..., c
′
l+1) in C
l+1 such that c1 = c
′
1, we have
(D.1) ul
(
c′ ⌣2l+1 d˜
∣∣ c˜ = c, c′ ⌣2l d˜) ∈ [1/2− α, 1/2 + α]
and for all m ∈ {1, ..., l} such that cm 6= c
′
m, for r = 2m− 2, 2m− 1,
(D.2) ul
(
c′ ⌣r+1 d˜
∣∣ c˜ = c, c′ ⌣r d˜) ∈ [1/2− α, 1/2 + α].
We say that the conditions UI2 are satisfied if for all 1 ≤ p ≤ l, for all d ∈ Dl,
for all d′ ∈ Dp−1, for all m ∈ {1, ..., p− 1} such that dm 6= d
′
m, for r = 2m− 1, 2m
(D.3) ul
(
c˜ ⌣r+1 d
′|d˜ = d, c˜ ⌣r d
′
)
∈ [1/2− α, 1/2 + α].
To understand the conditions UI1, consider the Bayesian game Γ(ul, gl+1), and
assume that player 2 truthfully reports his sequence of signals and that player
1 has received the signals (c1, ..., cl) in C
l. (D.1) states that if the sequence of
reported signals (c′1, d˜1, ..., c
′
l, d˜l) is nice at level 2l, then whatever the last reported
signal c′l+1, the conditional probability that (c
′
1, d˜1, ..., c
′
l, d˜l, c
′
l+1) is still nice is in
[1/2 − α, 1/2 + α], i.e. close to 1/2. Regarding (D.2), first notice that if c′ = c,
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then by construction (c′1, d˜1, ..., c
′
l, d˜l) is nice and u
l
(
c′ ⌣r+1 d˜
∣∣ c˜ = c, c′ ⌣r d˜) =
ul
(
c ⌣r+1 d˜
∣∣ c˜ = c) = 1 for each r = 1, ..., 2l − 1. Assume now that for some
m = 1, ..., l, player 1 misreports his mth-signal, i.e. reports c′m 6= cm. (D.2)
requires that given that the reported signals were nice so far (at level 2m − 2),
the conditional probability that the reported signals are not nice at level 2m − 1
(integrating c′m) is close to 1/2, and moreover if the reported signals are nice at
this level 2m− 1, adding the next signal d˜m of player 2 has probability close to 1/2
to keep the reported sequence nice. Conditions UI2 have a similar interpretation,
considering the Bayesian games Γ(ul, gp) for p ≤ l, assuming that player 1 reports
truthfully his signals and that player 2 plays d′ after having received the signals d.
Proposition 27. Conditions UI1 and UI2 imply :
∀l ≥ 1, ∀p ∈ {1, ..., l}, val(ul, gp) ≥ ε.(D.4)
∀l ≥ 1, val(ul, gl+1) ≤ −ε.(D.5)
As a consequence of this proposition, under conditions UI1 and UI2 we easily
obtain condition 1) of theorem 19 :
Corollary 28. If l 6= p then d(ul, up) ≥ 2ε.
Proof. Assume l > p, then d(ul, up) ≥ val(ul, gp+1)− val(up, gp+1) ≥ ε− (−ε). 
Proof of proposition 27. We assume that UI1 and UI2 hold. We fix l ≥ 1, work
on the probability space K ×Cl×Dl equipped with the probability ul, and denote
by c˜ and d˜ the random variables of the signals received by the players.
1) We first prove (D.4), and consider the game Γ(ul, gp) with p ∈ {1, ..., l}. We
assume that player 1 chooses the truthful strategy. Fix d = (d1, ..., dl) in D
l and
d′ = (d′1, ..., d
′
p−1) in D
p−1, and assume that player 2 has received the signal d and
chooses to report d′.
Define the non-increasing sequence of events:
An = {c˜ ⌣n d
′}.
We will prove by backward induction that:
(D.6) ∀n = 1, ..., p, E[hp(c˜, d′)|d˜ = d,A2n−1] ≥ ε.
If n = p, hp(c˜, d′) = ε on the event A2p−1, implying the result. Assume now that
for some n such that 1 ≤ n < p, we have : E[hp(c˜, d′)|d˜ = d,A2n+1] ≥ ε. Since we
have a non-increasing sequence of events, 1A2n−1 = 1A2n+1 +1A2n−1 1Ac2n +1A2n 1Ac2n+1 ,
so by definition of the payoffs, hp(c˜, d′)1A2n−1 = h
p(c˜, d′)1A2n+1 +5ε1A2n−1 1Ac2n −5ε1A2n 1Ac2n+1 .
First assume that d′n = dn. By construction of the Markov chain, u
l(A2n+1|A2n−1, d˜ =
d) = 1, implying that ul(Ac2n+1|A2n−1, d˜ = d) = u
l(Ac2n|A2n−1, d˜ = d) = 0. As a
consequence,
E[hp(c˜, d′)|d˜ = d,A2n−1] = E[h
p(c˜, d′)1A2n+1 |d˜ = d,A2n−1]
= E[E[hp(c˜, d′)|d˜ = d,A2n+1]1A2n+1 |d˜ = d,A2n−1]
≥ ε.
VALUE-BASED DISTANCE BETWEEN THE INFORMATION STRUCTURES 38
Assume now that d′n 6= dn. Assumption UI2 implies that :
ul(Ac2n|A2n−1, d˜ = d) ≥ 1/2− α,
ul(A2n ∩ A
c
2n+1|A2n−1, d˜ = d) ≤ (1/2 + α)
2,
ul(A2n+1|A2n−1, d˜ = d) ≥ (1/2− α)
2.
It follows that :
E[hp(c˜, d′|d˜) = d,A2n−1] = E[E[h
p(c˜, d′)|d˜ = d,A2n+1]1A2n+1 |d˜ = d,A2n−1]
+ 5εul(Ac2n|A2n−1, d˜ = d)− 5εu
l(A2n ∩ A
c
2n+1|A2n−1, d˜ = d)
≥ ε (
1
4
− α+ α2) + 5 ε (
1
2
− α)− 5 ε (
1
4
+ α+ α2)
= ε (
3
2
− 11α− 4α2) ≥ ε,
And (D.6) follows by backward induction.
Since A1 is an event which holds almost surely, we deduce that E[h
p(c˜, d′)|d˜ =
d] ≥ ε. Hence the truthful strategy of player 1 guarantees the payoff ε in Γ(ul, gp).
2) We now prove (D.5) and consider the Bayesian game Γ(ul, gl+1), assuming that
player 2 chooses the truthful strategy. Fix c = (c1, ..., cl) in C
l and c′ = (c′1, ..., c
′
l−1)
in Cl−1, and assume that player 1 has received the signal c and chooses to report
c′. We will show that the expected payoff of player 1 is not larger than −ε, and
assume w.l.o.g. that c′1 = c1. Consider the non-increasing sequence of events :
Bn = {c
′ ⌣n d˜ }.
We will prove by backward induction that:
∀n = 1, ..., l, E[hl+1(c′, d˜)|c˜ = c, B2n] ≤ −ε.
If n = l, we have 1B2l = 1B2l+1 +1B2l 1Bc2l+1 , and h
l+1(c′, d˜)1B2l = ε1B2l+1 −5ε1B2l 1Bc2l+1 .
UI1 implies that |ul(B2l+1|c˜ = c, B2l)−
1
2 | ≤ α , and it follows that :
E[hl+1(c′, d˜)|c˜ = c, B2l] = ε u
l(B2l+1|c˜ = c, B2l)− 5ε u
l(Bc2l+1|u = uˆ, B2l)
≤ ε (
1
2
+ α)− 5ε (
1
2
− α) ≤ −ε.
Assume now that for some n = 1, ..., l− 1, we have E[hl+1(c′, d˜)|c˜ = c, B2n+2] ≤
−ε. We have 1B2n = 1B2n+2 +1B2n 1Bc2n+1 +1B2n+1 1Bc2n+2 , and by definition of
hl+1,
hl+1(c′, d˜)1B2n = h
l+1(c′, d˜)1B2n+2 −5ε1B2n 1Bc2n+1 +5ε1B2n+1 1Bc2n+2 .
First assume that c′n+1 = cn+1, then u
l(B2n+2|B2n, c˜ = c) = 1. Then :
E[hl+1(c′, d˜)|c˜ = c, B2n] = E[h
l+1(c′, d˜)1B2n+2 |c˜ = c, B2n],
= E[E[hl+1(c′, d˜)|c˜ = c, B2n+2]1B2n+2 |c˜ = c, B2n] ≤ −ε.
Assume on the contrary that c′n+1 6= cn+1, assumption UI1 implies that :
ul(Bc2n+1|B2n, c˜ = c) ≥ 1/2− α,
ul(B2n+1 ∩B
c
2n+2|B2n, c˜ = c) ≤ (1/2 + α)
2,
ul(B2n+2|B2n, c˜ = c) ≥ (1/2− α)
2.
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It follows that :
E[hl+1(c′, d˜)|c˜ = c, B2n] = E[E[h
l+1(c′, d˜)|c˜ = c, B2n+2]1B2n+2 |c˜ = c, B2n]
− 5 ε ul(Bc2n+1|B2n, c˜ = c) + 5 ε u
l(B2n+1 ∩B
c
2n+2|B2n, c˜ = c)
≤ − ε (
1
4
− α+ α2)− 5 ε (
1
2
− α) + 5 ε (
1
4
+ α+ α2) ≤ −ε.
By induction, we obtain E[hl+1(c′, d˜)|c˜ = c, B2] ≤ −ε. Since B2 holds almost
surely here, we get E[hl+1(c′, d˜)|c˜ = c] ≤ −ε, showing that the truthful strategy
of player 2 guarantees that the payoff of the maximizer is less or equal to −ε, and
concluding the proof.
D.4. Existence of an appropriate Markov chain. Here we conclude the proof
of Theorem 19 by showing the existence of an even integer N and a Markov chain
with law ν on A = {1, ..., N} satisfying our conditions :
1) the law of the first state of the Markov chain is uniform on A,
2) for each a in A, there are exactly N/2 elements b in A such that ν(b|a) = 2/N ,
3) UI1 and UI2.
Denoting by P = (Pa,b)(a,b)∈A2 the transition matrix of the Markov chain, we
have to prove the existence of P satisfying 2) and 3). The proof is non constructive
and uses the following probabilistic method, where we select independently for each
a in A, the set {b ∈ A,Pa,b > 0} uniformly among the subsets of A with cardinal
N/2. We will show that when N goes to infinity, the probability of selecting an
appropriate transition matrix does not only become positive, but converges to 1.
Formally, denote by SA the collection of all subsets S ⊆ A with cardinality
|S| = 12N . We consider a collection (Sa)a∈A of i.i.d. random variables uniform
distributed over SA defined on a probability space (ΩN ,FN ,PN). For all a, b in A,
let
Xa,b = 1{b∈Sa} and Pa,b =
2
N
Xa,b.
By construction, P is a transition matrix satisfying 2). Theorem 19 will now follow
directly from the following proposition.
Proposition 29.
PN ( P induces a Markov chain satisfying UI1 and UI2 ) −−−−→
n→∞
1.
In particular, the above probability is strictly positive for all sufficiently large N .
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of proposition 29.
We start with probability bounds based on Hoeffding’s inequality.
Lemma 30. For any a 6= b, each γ > 0
PN
(∣∣∣∣|Sa ∩ Sb| − 14N
∣∣∣∣ ≥ γN) ≤ 12e4Ne−2γ2N .
Proof. Consider a family of i.i.d. Bernoulli variables (X˜i,j)i=a,b, j∈A of parameter
1
2
defined on a space (Ω,F ,P). For i = a, b, define the events L˜i = {
∑
j∈A X˜i,j =
N
2 }
and the set-valued variables S˜i = {j ∈ A | X˜i,j = 1}. It is straightforward to check
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that the conditional law of (S˜a, S˜b) given L˜a ∩ L˜b under P is the same as the law of
(Sa, Sb) under PN . It follows that
PN
(∣∣∣∣|Sa ∩ Sb| − 14N
∣∣∣∣ ≥ γN) = P(∣∣∣∣|S˜a ∩ S˜b| − 14N
∣∣∣∣ ≥ γN ∣∣∣ L˜a ∩ L˜b)
≤
P
(∣∣∣|S˜a ∩ S˜b| − 14N ∣∣∣ ≥ γN)
P
(
L˜a ∩ L˜b
) .
Using Hoeffding inequality, we have
P
(∣∣∣∣|S˜a ∩ S˜b| − 14N
∣∣∣∣ ≥ γN) = P

∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈A
X˜a,jX˜b,j −
1
4
N
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ γN
 ≤ 2e−2γ2N .
On the other hand, using Stirling approximation12, we have
P
(
L˜a ∩ L˜b
)
=
(
1
2N
N !(
N
2 !
)2
)2
≥
(
2N+1N−
1
2
2Ne2
)2
=
4
Ne4
.
We deduce that PN
(∣∣|Sa ∩ Sb| − 14N ∣∣ ≥ γN) ≤ 12e4Ne−2γ2N . 
Lemma 31. For each a 6= b, for any subset S ⊆ A and any γ ≥ 12N−2 ,
PN
(∣∣∣∣∣∑
i∈S
Xi,a −
1
2
|S|
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ γN
)
≤ 2e−2Nγ
2
, and PN
(∣∣∣∣∣∑
i∈S
Xi,aXi,b −
1
4
|S|
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ γN
)
≤ 2e−
1
2Nγ
2
.
Proof. For the first inequality, notice that Xi,a are i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables
with parameter 12 . The Hoeffding inequality implies that :
PN
(∣∣∣∣∣∑
i∈S
Xi,a −
1
2
|S|
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ γN
)
≤ 2e−2γ
2N2
|S| ≤ 2e−2Nγ
2
.

For the second inequality, let Zi = Xi,aXi,b. Notice that all variables Zi are
i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables with parameter p = 12
(
N
2 −1
N−1
)
= 14 −
1
4N−4 . The
Hoeffding inequality implies that
PN
(∣∣∣∣∣∑
i∈S
Zi −
1
4
|S|
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ γN
)
≤ PN
(∣∣∣∣∣∑
i∈S
Zi − p |S|
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 12γN
)
≤ 2e−2γ
2N2
|S| ≤ 2e−
1
2Nγ
2
,
where we used that |S||p− 14 | ≤
N
4N−4 ≤
γN
2 for the first inequality.
Definition 32. For each a 6= b and c 6= d, each γ > 0, define :
Ya = 2
∑
i∈AXi,a, Y
c = 2
∑
i∈AXc,i = N ,
Ya,b = 4
∑
i∈AXi,aXi,b, Y
c
a = 4
∑
i∈AXi,aXc,i, Y
c,d = 4
∑
i∈AXc,iXd,i,
Y ca,b = 8
∑
i∈AXi,aXi,bXc,i, Y
c,d
a = 8
∑
i∈AXi,aXc,iXd,i, Y
c,d
a,b = 16
∑
i∈AXi,aXi,bXc,iXd,i.
12We have nn+
1
2 e−n ≤ n! ≤ enn+
1
2 e−n for each n.
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Lemma 33. For each a 6= b and c 6= d, each γ ≥ 64/N, each of the variables
Z ∈ {Ya, Y
c, Ya,b, Y
c,d, Y ca , Y
c
a,b, Y
c,d
a , Y
c,d
a,b },
PN (|Z −N | ≥ γN) ≤ e
4Ne−
N
32 (
γ
10 )
2
.
Proof. In case Z = Ya or Ya,b, the bound follows from Lemma 31 (for S = A). If
case Z = Y c, the bound is trivially satisfied. If Z = Y c,d, the bound follows from
Lemma 30.
In case Z = Y c,da,b , notice that
Y c,da,b = 16
∑
i∈Sc∩Sd
Zi, where Zi = Xi,aXi,b.
All variables Zi are i.i.d. Bernouilli random variables with parameter p =
1
4−
1
4N−4 .
Moreover, {Zi}i6=c,d are independent of Sc∩Sd. Up to enlarge the probability space,
we can construct a new collection of i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables Z ′i such that
Z ′i = Zi for all i 6= c, d and such that {(Z
′
i)i∈A, Sc ∩ Sd} are all independent. Then,∣∣∣∣∣Y c,da,b − 16 ∑
i∈Sc∩Sd
Z ′i
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 32,
and, because 12γN ≥ 32, we have
PN
(∣∣∣Y c,da,b −N ∣∣∣ ≥ γN) ≤ PN
(∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
i∈Sc∩Sd
Z ′i −
1
16
N
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 132γN
)
.
Define the events
A =
{∣∣∣∣14 |Sc ∩ Sd| − N16
∣∣∣∣ ≥ 1160γN
}
, B =
{∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
i∈Sc∩Sd
Z ′i −
1
4
|Sc ∩ Sd|
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 140γN
}
.
Then, the probability can be further bounded by
≤ PN (A) + PN (B) ≤
1
2
e4Ne−2N(
1
40 γ)
2
+ 2e−
1
2N(
1
40γ)
2
≤ e4Ne−
Nγ2
3200
where the first bound comes from Lemma 30, and the second from the second bound
in Lemma 31.
The remaining bounds have proofs similar (and simpler) to the case Z = Y c,da,b .

Finally, we describe an event E that collects these bounds. Recall that α = 1/25,
and define for each a 6= b and c 6= d,
Ea,b,c,d =
{∣∣∣∣Ya,bYa − 1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2α} ∩ {∣∣∣∣Y ca,bY ca − 1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2α} ∩ {∣∣∣∣Y c,daY ca − 1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2α} ∩
{∣∣∣∣∣Y
c,d
a,b
Y c,da
− 1
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2α
}
{∣∣∣∣Y c,dY c − 1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2α} ∩ {∣∣∣∣Y caY c − 1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2α} ∩ {∣∣∣∣Y c,daY c,d − 1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2α} .
Finally, let
E =
⋂
a,b,c,d:a 6=b and c 6=d
Ea,b,c,d.
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Lemma 34. We have
PN (E) > 1− 7e
4N5e−
N
2163200 −−−−→
n→∞
1.
Proof. Take γ = α1+α =
1
26 and let
Fa,b,c,d =
⋂
Z∈{Ya,Ya,b,Y c,d,Y c,d,Y ca ,Y
c
a,b
,Y c,da ,Y
c,d
a,b
}
{|Z −N | ≤ γN} .
It is easy to see that Fa,b,c,d ⊆ Ea,b,c,d. The probability that Fa,b,c,d holds can be
bounded from Lemma 33 (as soon as N ≥ 64γ = 1664), as
PN (Fa,b,c,d) ≥ 1− 7e
4Ne
− N
32.(260)2 .
The result follows since there are less than N4 ways of choosing (a, b, c, d). 
Computations using the bound of lemma 34 show that N = 52.106 is enough to
have the existence of an appropriate Markov chain. So one can take ε = 3.10−17 in
the statement of theorem 19. We conclude the proof of proposition 29 by showing
that event E implies conditions UI1 and UI2.
Lemma 35. If event E holds, then the conditions UI1, UI2 are satisfied.
Proof. We fix the law ν of the Markov chain on A and assume that it has been
induced, as explained at the beginning of section D.4, by a transition matrix P
satisfying E. For l ≥ 1, we forget about the state in K and still denote by ul the
marginal of ul over Cl × Dl. If c = (c1, ..., cl) ∈ C
l and d = (d1, ..., dl) ∈ D
l, we
have ul(c, d) = ν(c1, d1, ..., cl, dl).
Let us begin with condition UI2 which we recall here: for all 1 ≤ p ≤ l, for
all d ∈ Dl, for all d′ ∈ Dp−1, for all m ∈ {1, ..., p − 1} such that dm 6= d
′
m, for
r = 2m− 1, 2m,
ul
(
c˜ ⌣r+1 d
′|d˜ = d, c˜ ⌣r d
′
)
∈ [1/2− α, 1/2 + α], (D.3)
where (c˜, d˜) is a random variable selected according to ul. The quantity ul
(
c˜ ⌣r+1 d
′|d˜ = d, c˜ ⌣r d
′
)
is thus the conditional probability of the event (c˜ and d′ are nice at level r + 1)
given that they are nice at level r and that the signal received by player 2 is d. We
divide the problem into different cases.
Case m > 1 and r = 2m− 1.
Note that the events {c˜ ⌣2m d
′} and {c˜ ⌣2m−1 d
′} can be decomposed as
follows :
{c˜ ⌣2m−1 d
′} = {c˜ ⌣2m−2 d
′} ∩ {Xd′m−1,c˜m = 1},
{c˜ ⌣2m d
′} = {c˜ ⌣2m−2 d
′} ∩ {Xd′m−1,c˜m = 1} ∩ {Xc˜m,d′m = 1}.
So ul
(
c˜ ⌣2m d
′|d˜ = d, c˜ ⌣2m−1 d
′
)
= ul
(
Xc˜m,d′m = 1|d˜ = d, c˜ ⌣2m−1 d
′
)
, and the
Markov property gives:
ul
(
c˜ ⌣2m d
′|d˜ = d, c˜ ⌣2m−1 d
′
)
= ul
(
Xc˜m,d′m = 1|Xd′m−1,c˜m = 1, Xdm−1,c˜m = 1, Xc˜m,dm = 1
)
,
=
∑
i∈U Xi,d′mXd′m−1,iXdm−1,iXi,dm∑
i∈U Xd′m−1,iXdm−1,iXi,dm
.
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This is equal to 12
Y
dm−1,d
′
m−1
dm,d
′
m
Y
dm−1,d
′
m−1
dm
if d′m−1 6= dm−1, and to
1
2
Y
dm−1
dm,d
′
m
Y
dm−1
dm
if d′m−1 = dm−1. In
both cases, E implies (D.3).
Case r = 2m.
We have ul
(
c˜ ⌣2m+1 d
′|d˜ = d, c˜ ⌣2m d
′
)
= ul
(
Xd′m,c˜m+1 = 1|d˜ = d, c˜ ⌣2m d
′
)
,
and by the Markov property :
ul
(
c˜ ⌣2m+1 d
′|d˜ = d, c˜ ⌣2m d
′
)
= ul
(
Xd′m,c˜m+1 = 1|Xdm,c˜m+1 = 1, Xc˜m+1,dm+1 = 1
)
,
=
∑
i∈U Xd′m,iXdm,iXi,dm+1∑
i∈U Xdm,iXi,dm+1
=
1
2
Y
d′m,dm
dm+1
Y dmdm+1
∈ [1/2− α, 1/2 + α].
Case m = 1, r = 1.
ul
(
c˜ ⌣2 d
′|d˜ = d, c˜ ⌣1 d
′
)
= ul
(
c˜ ⌣2 d
′|d˜ = d
)
,
= ul
(
Xc˜1,d′1 = 1|Xc˜1,d1 = 1
)
,
=
∑
i∈U Xi,d′1Xi,d1∑
i∈U Xi,d1
=
1
2
Yd1,d′1
Yd1
∈ [1/2− α, 1/2 + α].
Let us now consider condition UI1: we require that for all l ≥ 1, all c = (c1, ..., cl)
in Cl and c′ = (c′1, ..., c
′
l+1) in C
l+1 such that c1 = c
′
1, we have
ul
(
c′ ⌣2l+1 d˜
∣∣ c˜ = c, c′ ⌣2l d˜) ∈ [1/2− α, 1/2 + α] (D.1)
and for all m ∈ {1, ..., l} such that cm 6= c
′
m, for r = 2m− 2, 2m− 1,
ul
(
c′ ⌣r+1 d˜
∣∣ c˜ = c, c′ ⌣r d˜) ∈ [1/2− α, 1/2 + α]. (D.2)
We start with (D.1).
ul
(
c′ ⌣2l+1 d˜|c˜ = c, c
′ ⌣2l d˜
)
= ul
(
Xd˜l,c′l+1
= 1|c˜ = c, c′ ⌣2l d˜
)
,
= ul
(
Xd˜l,c′l+1
= 1|Xc
l
,d˜l
= 1, Xc′
l
,d˜l
= 1
)
,
=
∑
i∈V Xi,c′l+1Xcl,iXc′l,i∑
i∈V Xcl,iXc′l,i
.
This is 12
Y
cl,c
′
l
cl+1
Y cl,c
′
l
if c′l 6= cl, and
1
2
Y
cl
cl+1
Y cl if c
′
l = cl. In both cases, (D.1) holds.
We finally consider (D.2) and distinguish several case.
Case r = 2m− 1 and m = l.
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ul
(
c′ ⌣2l d˜|c˜ = c, c
′ ⌣2l−1 d˜
)
= ul
(
Xc′
l
,d˜l
= 1|c˜ = c, c′ ⌣2l−1 d˜
)
,
= ul
(
Xc′
l
,d˜l
= 1|Xc
l
,d˜l
= 1
)
,
=
∑
i∈V Xc′l,iXcl,i∑
i∈V Xcl,i
,
=
1
2
Y c
′
l,cl
Y cl
∈ [1/2− α, 1/2 + α].
Case r = 2m− 1 and m < l.
ul
(
c′ ⌣2m d˜|c˜ = c, c
′ ⌣2m−1 d˜
)
= ul
(
Xc′m,d˜m
= 1|c˜ = c, c′ ⌣2m−1 d˜
)
,
= ul
(
Xc′m,d˜m
= 1|Xcm,d˜m = 1, Xd˜m,cm+1 = 1
)
,
=
∑
i∈V Xc′m,iXcm,iXi,cm+1∑
i∈V Xcm,iXi,cm+1
,
=
1
2
Y
c′m,cm
cm+1
Y cmcm+1
∈ [1/2− α, 1/2 + α].
Case r = 2m− 2.
ul
(
c′ ⌣2m−1 d˜|c˜ = c, c
′ ⌣2m−2 d˜
)
= ul
(
Xd˜m−1,c′m
= 1|c˜ = c, c′ ⌣2m−1 d˜
)
,
= ul
(
Xd˜m−1,c′m
= 1|Xc′m−1,d˜m−1
= Xcm−1,d˜m−1 = Xd˜m−1,cm = 1
)
,
=
∑
i∈V Xi,c′mXi,cmXc′m−1,iXcm−1,i∑
i∈V Xi,cmXc′m−1,iXcm−1,i
.
This is 12
Y
c′m−1,cm−1
c′m,cm
Y
c′
m−1
cm−1
cm
if cm−1 6= c
′
m−1, and
1
2
Y
cm−1
c′m,cm
Y
cm−1
cm
if cm−1 = c
′
m−1. In both cases,
it belongs to [1/2− α, 1/2 + α], concluding the proofs of lemma 35, proposition 29
and theorem 19. 
Appendix E. Proofs of Section 7
E.1. Proof of Theorem 22. Suppose that u and v are two simple, and non-
redundant information structures. Let u˜ and v˜ be the associated probability dis-
tributions over belief hierarchies of player 1. It is easy to show that if two non-
redundant information structures induce the same distributions over hierarchies of
beliefs u˜ = v˜, then they are equivalent from any strategic point of view, and, in
particular, they induce the same set of ex ante BNE payoffs. Hence, we assume
that u˜ 6= v˜.
Let Hu = suppu˜ and Hv = suppv˜. Lemma III.2.7 in Mertens et al. (2015)
implies that the sets Hu and Hv are disjoint.
It is well known that there exists a non-zero sum payoff function g(0) : K ×
(I × I0)×J → [−1, 1]
2 such that I0 = Hu∪Hv and such that the set of rationalizable
actions for player 1 of type c ∈ C with hierarchy h (c) is contained in the set
I×{h (c)}. In particular, in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, each type of
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report its hierarchy. Construct game g(1) : K × (I × I0) × (J × {u, v}) → [−1, 1]
2
with payoffs
g
(1)
1 (k, i, i0, j, j0) = g
(0)
1 (k, i, i0, j) ,
g
(1)
2 (k, i, i0, j, j0) =
1
2
g
(0)
2 (k, i, i0, j) +

1
2 , if j0 = u and i0 ∈ Hu
− 12 , if j0 = u and i0 /∈ Hu,
0, if j0 = v.
Then, the rationalizable actions of player 2 in game g(1) are contained in J × {u}
for any type in type space u and in J × {v} for any type in type space v.
Finally, for any ε ∈ (0, 1) ,construct a game gε : K × (I × I0) × (J × {u, v}) →
[−1, 1]
2
with payoffs
gε1 (k, i, i0, j, j0) = εg
(0)
1 (k, i, i0, j, j0) + (1− ε)
{
1, if j0 = u,
−1, if j0 = v,
,
gε2 ≡ g
(1)
2 .
Then, the Bayesian Nash equilibrium payoff of player belongs to [1− ε, 1] on the
structure u and [−1,−1 + ε] on the structure v. It follows that the payoff distance
between the two type spaces is at least 2− 2ε, for arbitrary ε > 0.
Next, suppose that u and v are two simple information structures with the
decomposition u =
∑
α pαuα and v =
∑
α qαvα and such that u˜α = v˜α for each
α. Let g be a non-zero sum payoff function. Let σα be an equilibrium on uα with
payoffs gα ∈ R
2. Let sα is the associated equilibrium on vα (that can be obtained
by mapping the hierarchies of beliefs through an appropriate bijection) with the
same payoffs gα. The distance between payoffs is bounded my∣∣∣∑ pαga − qαgα∣∣∣
max
=
∣∣∣∑ (pα − qα) gα∣∣∣
max
≤
∑
|pα − qα| ,
where the last inequality comes from the fact that payoffs are bounded.
On the other hand, let A = {α : pα > qα}. Using a similar construction as above,
we can construct a game g(1) such that player 2’s actions have a form J×{uA, uB},
and his rationalizable actions are contained in set J × {uA} for any type in type
space uα, α ∈ A and in J × {uB} otherwise. Further, we construct a game g
(ε) as
above. Then, any player 1’s equilibrium g
(ε)
1,α payoff is at least 1− ε for any type in
type space uα, α ∈ A, and −1+ε for any type in type space uα for α /∈ A. Denoting
the equilibrium payoff of player 2 as gε2,ε, the payoff distance in game g
ε is at least
max
(∣∣∣∣∣∑
α
(pα − qα) g1,α
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
∣∣∣∣∣∑
α
(pα − qα) g2,α
∣∣∣∣∣
)
≥
∣∣∣∣∣∑
α
(pα − qα) g1,α
∣∣∣∣∣
≥
[∑
α∈A
(pα − qα)−
∑
α/∈A
(pα − qα)
]
(1− ε)
≥ (1− ε)
∑
|pα − qα| .
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Because the ε > 0 is arbitrary, the two above inequalities show that the payoff
distance is equal to
∑
|pα − qα|.
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